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Foreign Corporations and Local
Corporate Policy
Stanley A. Kaplan*
Due to competitive pressures from states with comparatively unrestric-
tive corporation statutes, the corporation acts of most states have
become enabling rather than regulatory statutes, designed for greater
freedom of incorporation rather than greater investor protection.
Professor Kaplan examines the state corporation acts from the point of
view of statutory directives and common law conflict of laws doctrine
and seeks to answer two main questions: (1) whether the courts of the
host state legally and constitutionally may impose its laws upon the
internal affairs of foreign corporations; and (2) whether the states have
sufficient public policy doctrines underlying their corporation statutes
to impose their requirements upon the internal affairs of foreign corpo-
rations. The author suggests that it is now appropriate to reconsider
the question of federal incorporation.
I. INMODUCTION: TrM PROBLEM
During the past half century, the state corporation statute has in
large measure been transformed from a device to control, restrict,
and govern the corporations chartered under it into an enabling act
granting to enterprisers the relatively unrestricted opportunity to
devise the type of entity which they desire. The growing reduction
of statutory controls over possible impropriety and financial manipula-
tion under the various state corporation statutes has occurred simul-
taneously with a markedly inconsistent countermovement. In the
1930's, it was fashionable to blame a large proportion of the nation's
economic ills upon the financial improprieties of wicked promoters,
speculators, and financiers who were asserted to have engaged in
"predatory" trading and to have created securities markets that were
largely false and deceptive.' Part of these activities were outside the
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago Law School. Ph.B., J.D. University of
Chicago, 1931, 1933; L.L.M. Columbia University, 1934.
1. See generally Hearings on S. Res. 97 Before the Comm. on Banking and Currency,
73d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1934); Hearings on S. Res. 8456 Before the Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 72d Cong., 2d Sess. (1932); SEC, RePoRT oN Tin STuoy AN
INvEsTiGATION oF THE WonT, AcrTvrnEs, PEasomnsi AN FuNC-noNs or Piotc=rr
Am o RE RGANmAoN Co~N-rr=s pt. II, at 315-51 (1937); Yourd, Trading in
Securities by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities and
Exchange Act, 38 MicH. L. Prav. 133 (1939); Note, Denial of Reorganization Profits
On Bonds Purchased By Insiders During Insolvency, 59 YALE L.J. 151 (1947).
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sphere of the normal state corporation statute and were dealt with
in state or federal securities acts; however, others were within the
area normally handled by state corporation acts. Because of public,
political, and academic outcries over the alleged financial chicanery,
increasingly stringent controls were placed upon security sales and
dealings. Such controls were achieved to some extent through stiffen-
ing state securities regulation but primarily pursuant to the Securities
Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and the administra-
tion of these acts by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
Thus legislative controls over financial misdeeds were imposed
largely by measures extrinsic to the state corporation statutes and
in a manner parallel to and competitive with them. Concurrently,
state corporation statutes, in general, have tended to play a diminish-
ing role in the control of financial impropriety. The regulation of
securities matters has expanded through securities legislation and
administrative action; corporation acts have simultaneously and anti-
thetically moved toward the enabling act2 type, and investor protec-
tion thereunder has tended to contract.
This article will not attempt to document the thesis that there are
corporate abuses or that an enabling act is less desirable than a regula-
tory type of statute.3 It is sufficient to assert or presume that there
may be internal corporate abuses and that it may be desirable for
some states, if they so choose, to have corporation statutes which
are more than enabling acts and which limit or regulate specified
aspects of corporate conduct. The question of whether it is feasible
2. The following quotation describes the different types of theories underlying
corporation statutes, each reflecting ". . . a different conception of the appropriate
role the government should play in this area. . . . At one extreme, under the so-called
'enabling act' theory, the privilege of incorporation would be made freely available,
with a minimum of special conditions and limitations. Somewhat more restrictive is
another theory whose adherents, although essentially persuaded of the social efficacy
of enlightened self-interest, favor the interposition of legislative safeguards at critical
junctures where experience has indicated that difficulties may arise. Another theory
would, by legislative prescription, even more systematically impinge on freedom to
contract, not only to protect investors and creditors, but to create and preserve the
atmosphere of public confidence so necessary for business prosperity. And, finally, at
the other extreme, the proponents of the so-called 'social responsibility' theory urge that
corporate power be exercised not primarily for the benefit of investors and creditors,
or even customers and employees, but rather for the benefit of the general public."
Shimm, Foreword to 23 LAW & CoNrT mi. PRoB. at 175 (1958).
3. See, e.g., H. REUSCOLE N, THE ScnooLs OF CoronArn REaonmi (1950); Emerson,
Vital Weaknesses in the New Virginia Stock Corporation Law and the Model Act, 42
VA. L. RLEv. 489 (1956); Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to
Irresponsibility? 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1955); Jennings, The Role of the States in
Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CoNTEMN. Pnon. 193 (1958);
Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business Corporation Law of New York,
11 BuF-r~o L. REv. 591 (1962); Wright, Current Developments in Statutory Corpora-
tion Law, 7 MmxAX L.Q. 1 (1952).
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for a state to maintain a corporation statute which attempts closely to
regulate the internal affairs of the corporation is then posed. The
answer to such an inquiry is necessarily intertwined with the practices
by which corporate charters are issued by the various states and
with the federal character of our governmental structure. It is
probable that the present characteristic leniency of corporation laws
throughout the United States is in significant measure traceable to
the ready availability of charters under the permissive statutes of such
states as Delaware.4 The organizers of a corporation may obtain their
charter in any state, without regard to the place where the corporation
will conduct its activities or to the residence of the interested parties.
Several states have succumbed to the revenue temptations inherent
in the process of incorporating and offer charters to all comers on
cheap terms with minimal internal restrictions. A race in the com-
petitive laxity of corporation laws has succeeded in attracting to states
such as Nevada or Delaware an inordinate proportion of the major
corporations in the United States.5 Such competition from small states
with little business or financial activity of their own has had the effect
of inducing states, where commercial activity is heavier, to adopt com-
parably flexible corporation requirements in order to retain some
4. "A great barrier to the inclusion of strong protective features in any state corpora-
tion law long has been the utter futility of such features in face of the ease of evasion
by simply incorporating in a state free from controls and then bringing the resulting
'foreign' corporation into the state to do business as a foreign corporation that is
regulated, particularly in its internal affairs, by the law of the state of incorporation."
Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business Corporation Law of Neu>
York, 11 BurFAo L. REv. 591, 609-10 (1962). See also the dissent of Mr. Justice
Brandeis in Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 557 (1933). See "More Firms Adopt
Delaware as Legal Home to Benefit from Liberal Corporation Law," The Wall Street
Journal, April 16, 1968, at 4.
5. "The logical place to incorporate a corporation is the state within whose borders
it will carry on its business. Relatively few small corporations are incorporated outside
the state. It is the occasional larger than average business which seeks the most
advantageous laws and becomes a foreign corporation. While Delaware ranks only
twelfth on the foregoing list of number of incorporations, its significance is much
greater because a high percentage of important corporations are formed in Delaware
and many businesses which originally were formed elsewhere are subsequently trans-
ferred to Delaware when they become successful. Of the approximately 1250 corpo-
rations listed on the New York Stock Exchange on January 4, 1965, 433 or 35% were
Delaware corporations. The next most popular state was New York with 164 or 13%.
New Jersey, which years ago was the most favored state, is now third on the list with
84 or less than 7%. The only other states contributing as much as 5% were Ohio
with 72 and Pennsylvania with 66." G. SEwAnD, BASIC CORPORATE PRACTICE 5 (1966).
According to a letter dated October 3, 1967, from the Secretary of State of Delaware,
that state has approximately 50,000 domestic and 1350 foreign corporations registered.
This compares with approximately 428,496 domestic stock corporations and 34,320
foreign corporations in the State of New York, 78,909 domestic corporations and
14,543 foreign corporations in Illinois, approximately 200,000 domestic corporations
and 50,000 foreign corporations in Pennsylvania and approximately 55,369 domestic and
4,878 foreign corporations in California.
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measure of control over the corporate activities of their own citizens.
The general corporation laws of many states have been watered down
in order to deter local enterprises from the temptation of Delaware
incorporation. For example, the Governor of Michigan, in his 1921
message to the Michigan Legislature, stated that it was useless to
pass a stringent corporation act because "all of our corporations will
come back to us as foreign corporations."6 Despite such competition
as Michigan's, the ingenuity of the Delaware legislature has out-
paced the efforts of other states to provide equal attractions to the
organizers of corporationsY Corporations still stream out of states
such as Illinois to avoid the requirement of cumulative voting.8
Despite the opinion of the Secretary of State of Michigan, expressed
in 1934, that "Michigan's new Corporation Code, Act 327, Public
Acts of 1931 has given to Michigan corporations practically all
the advantages which might be received under incorporation in any
outside state," Michigan corporations still move to Delaware. In
addition to lower capital stock or franchise taxes in Delaware, other
advantages which induce corporate maangements to seek incorpo-
ration in Delaware include: greater freedom to pay dividends and
make distributions; greater ease of charter amendment and less
restrictions upon selling assets, mortgaging, leasing, and merging,
due to the lower percentage of shareholder approval required and
also by virtue of lesser rights of appraisal for dissenting minority
shareholders; freedom from mandatory cumulative voting; permission
to have staggered boards of directors; lesser pre-emptive rights for
shareholders; clearer rights of indemnification for directors and of-
ficers; greater freedom of action in many crucial respects for man-
agement; and a climate of opinion, thought to be prevalent in the
6. MxcwcAr H.R. Jotm. 37 (1921). See also note 126 infra.
7. The attraction of Delaware has usually been attributed to that state's non-
restrictive laws, but is perhaps equally explainable by the 'crudeness and backwardness'
of the corporation laws of many other states. H. BALLANTINu, ConronAmoNs § 11
(rev. ed. 1946). This statement may have had some validity as of thirty or forty
years ago but is without validity today in most states and certainly with respect to the
larger financial states.
8. In response to an inquiry, the Corp. Div. of the Office of the See. of State of Ill.
replied in 1967 that:
A greater portion of large Illinois business corporations have migrated to
Delaware many years ago, not only for the reason of cumulative voting, but
also for the purpose of issuing non-voting stock.
In a subsequent letter, it was also stated:
It is estimated that approximately 350 Illinois domestic corporations have
reincorporated in other states and returned to Illinois as foreign corporations
within the past two years. The primary reasons for these rules are the Illinois
capital stock tax, provisions of the Illinois statute which require that all
shareholders be granted voting rights, and the decisions of the Illinois Supreme
Court outlawing staggered boards of directors.
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legislature and courts, generally favorable to management and gen-
erally unreceptive to the dissident minority shareholder.
In the 1920's and 1930's the growing corporate prominence of states
which were granting relatively unrestricted charters was widely de-
nounced. The methods used to attract incorporators by the states
which exported charters as business commodities were described as
beneath the dignity of the sovereign state and spoken of in terms
of "peddling" and the issuing of "robber's licenses."9 Gresham's Law
was cited, in sad recognition of the fact that the cheap drives out
the good. The terms "charter-mongering," "tramp corporation," "pseu-
do-foreign corporation" and other epithets, which have been used in
connection with the foreign incorporation process, are all disapprov-
ing. This kind of pejorative rhetoric assumes the existence of a
higher degree of public virtue in the larger commercial states of the
country. On the other hand, so long as a state has the undoubted
right to issue a corporate charter upon such terms as it sees fit and
the right to permit an entity so chartered to do business in another
state but be governed by the corporation law of the place of incorpo-
ration,10 the legitimacy of such an attitude of moral superiority may
be questioned. If the state which does not issue the charter does not
have a public policy of sufficient importance or firmness to safeguard
and protect its interests in such a situation, then there may be no
justification for criticizing chartering activity of the incorporating
state, in the face of the other state's disinterest or apathy.
It is the purpose of this article to investigate two areas of inquiry
growing out of the problem briefly sketched above: first, whether
the non-incorporating state in such a situation can legally and consti-
tutionally take action to govern the internal affairs of a foreign cor-
poration; and second, whether there is a sufficient public policy under-
lying the corporation statutes to impel a state to enforce its public
policy for the purpose of governing the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation.
9. For denunciations of the ability to obtain corporate charters where the connection
is only nominal, see W. RiPLEY, MAW STREET AND WALL STrET (1927); WORNOWER,
FRANKENSTEIN, IN c. (1930); Address by Charles Terry, President of the Commission
on Uniform State Laws, 37 ABA ANN. REP. 1044 (1914); 20 C.J.S. Corporations, §§
1793-94 (1940); Church, The Tramp Corporation, 64 ALBANY L.J. 275 (1902); Foley,
Foreign Corporations, 6 ENCYC. OF Soc. Scr. 354-58 (1931); Jackson, Unsound Corpora-
tion Laws, PoLITY, at 9, May 20, 1933.
10. "It is no fraud or evasion of the laws of a State for its citizens, intending to
act only in their own State, to form themselves into a corporation under the laws of
another State." 2 J. BAL.E, CONFLIcT OF LAWS 775 (1935). For early discussions of
a "fraud upon the law" concept in connection with foreign incorporation which is
not adopted by the courts, see State ex rel. Brown Contracting & Building Co. v. Cook,
181 Mo. 596, 80 S.W. 929 (1904); and Demarest v. Flack, 128 N.Y. 205, 28 N.E. 645
(1891).
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For the purpose of simplifying references, the state of incorpora-
tion will be referred to as the "chartering state" and the state to which
the corporation migrates for the purpose of doing business as a for-
eign corporation will be called the "host state." Unless the context
otherwise indicates, all foreign corporations whose activities will be
discussed will be assumed to be engaged in intrastate commerce with-
in the host state; the right to engage in interstate commerce within
the host state is protected by the commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States and involves different considerations than those
which will be dealt with here.11
There are several different types of entities which are included
within the broad term "foreign corporation." A host state may have
the power to apply its local law to the internal affairs12 of a corpora-
tion which is incorporated in another state by citizens of the host
state but which does all its business and has its head office in the
host state where all its business life is lived; this type of entity has
been termed a "pseudo-foreign corporation."13 The host state's powers
may be quite different and less extensive if the foreign corporation
has its main office and does substantially all of its business in the
state where it was incorporated and has no contact with the host
state other than conducting a small portion of its business there.
Such an entity will, for convenience, be called a "genuine foreign
corporation." Another type of entity is a corporation which is in-
corporated in one state, has its main office in another state and has
its business activities scattered widely throughout the country. Its
business relationship to the particular host state consists of a branch
office from which a small percentage of its total business is done. Its
stockholders are widely scattered, and its main office and corporate
meetings are outside the host state. A corporation such as this-
which shall be termed a "national corporation"--does not have an
overriding identification or connection with any particular host state,
except possibly the state where its head office is located. The last
11. See generally G. H-NDmERSON, THE PosrrioN OF FOREIGN CORPORATIONS IN
AmucAN CoNsTrru-no;rAL LAW ch. VII (1918).
12. Although there has been much dispute over the definition of "internal affairs,"
a widely accepted definition was given by the Maryland Supreme Court: "[w~here
the act complained of affects the complainant solely in his capacity as a member of the
corporation, whether it be as stockholder, director, president, or other officer, and is
the act of the corporation, whether acting in stockholders' meeting, or through its
agents, the board of directors . . . then such action is the management of the internal
affairs of the corporation .... ." North State Copper & Gold Mining Co. v. Field,
64 Md. 151, 154, 20 A. 1039, 1040 (1885). As used in RESTATEMIENT (SECOND) OF
CoNFucT OF LAws § 192, Comment a at 126 (Tent. Draft No. 7, as revised 1963):
". .. a corporation's internal affairs are involved whenever the issue concerns the
relations inter se of the corporation, its stockholders, directors, officers or agents."
13. Latty, Powers & Breckenridge, The Proposed North Carolina Business Corpora-
tion Act, 33 N.C.L. REv. 26, 52-53 (1954).
[(VOL. 21
1968] FOREIGN AND LOCAL CORPORATE POLICY 439
type of corporation is the one which is organized by citizens of two
or more states who effect incorporation in one state and then do
business in two or three other states. Its ties to the state of incorpo-
ration will be limited to the single fact of the issuance of the charter.
Its ties to each of the other two or three states will be substantially
equivalent, so that the corporation cannot easily be identified with one
host state to the exclusion of others. Since this type of corporation
cannot readily be said to be seeking its out-of-state charter in order
to avoid the laws of a single particular host state, and since it is
connected with several host states to a significant extent, it differs
factually-and possibly legally-from the "pseudo-foreign corporation"
described above. For ease of reference such corporations will be
referred to as "quasi-foreign corporations."14
The appropriate law to govern the internal affairs of a corporation
-what might be called "proper law" of the corporation-has been
discussed, with varying degrees of concern and attention, since the
corporation became a significant form of business entity. Most of
the theoretical discussion has been conducted in the writings of conti-
nental theorists. In earlier times, when the word "corporation" pri-
marily denoted a legal entity created by direct and specific royal
grant, there was not much question but that the governance of its
internal affairs would be determined either by the charter itself or
by the sovereign who granted it. The liability of such an entity to
third persons, in such a matter as a contract, would be decided by
private conflict of laws rules, in the same manner as a contract ques-
tion where both contracting parties were individuals. But disputes
between various participants in the corporate enterprise or between
management and the corporation or between management and share-
holders would be referred back to the law of the creating state.
Comity and respect for sovereignty could dictate no less.
In the 18th and 19th centuries, continental theorists discussed at
great-length and with much spun-out erudition the question of which
law should govern the internal affairs of a corporation.'5 There was
also a considerable amount of academic and theoretical American dis-
cussion of these questions at an earlier stage in American commercial
development, when the nation was in the process of becoming fa-
14. One might question the utility or desirability of adding additional cumbersome
terms and spinning new but minor distinctions. This process is believed justified and
useful if it lends emphasis to the need for breaking down discussions of foreign corpora-
tion matters from the monolithic question of "the" foreign corporation into its different
components, so that each type of foreign corporation can be considered upon the basis
of its own set of facts and its own constellation of state and private interests.
15. See generally, BADE, ALEN COROPrAONS IN CONFMCrS OF LAWS (1953);
E. RABEL, Tm CoNFLIcT OF LAws, A CoMnAATrvE SrUDY, chs. 18-19 (2d ed 1958);
Latty, Pseudo-Foreign Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 166 et seq (1955).
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miliarized with its current pattern of extensive commerce among the
states conducted in corporate form.16 The question of choosing the
appropriate law was generally framed in substantially the following
fashion: should the controlling law be that of (1) the place of in-
corporation (even though the entity was merely incorporated there
and it did business and was located elsewhere); or (2) the place
where it located its "administrative headquarters" (its central execu-
tive offices); or (3) the place where it carried on most of its busi-
ness activities? Suppose a corporation chartered in country A locates
its head offices in country B and conducts its business almost entirely
in country C. In general, and without recapitulating the refined and
elaborate learning on this subject, Britain and the United States would
look to country A, the place of incorporation, as the source of the law
in governing the internal affairs of a corporation. In the same situ-
ation, France and Germany would give consideration to the location
of the corporation's head office and the primary place of doing busi-
ness in order to decide where the administrative center is located
and would probably decide upon country B. Much of the discussion
in deciding which laws would be controlling with respect to the
corporation's internal affairs would be expressed in the rhetoric of de-
termining where the corporation had its domicile. The various legal
theories of the different countries involved would each locate the
domicile of the corporation at a different situs and would then derive,
from the laws of the place in which the domicile was "discovered,"
the applicable rules.
In general, a simplistic approach to the problem of determining the
law applicable to the internal affairs of foreign corporations has
characterized American commentary and decisions. The doctrine
which selects administrative seat or the primary place of doing busi-
ness as the commercial domicile (the domiciliary alternative to the
state of incorporation) has not made headway in American law. The
American approach has almost uniformly equated domicile with the
place of incorporation and then lerived the governing law from the
chartering state. This rationale has eschewed the possibility of a domi-
cile in any state other than the place of incorporation. Though this
method had the disadavantage of artificiality, it had the presumably
greater merit of simplicity and unity. The earlier American theorists
(as typified by Beale) treated the domicile-equals-place-of-incorpo-
ration theorem as axiomatic.
Most American courts follow the same approach. In the Restate-
16. Henderson, supra note 11, at cs. I-II; Rabel, supra note 15, at ch. 19. For
discussions of the beginnings of the law of foreign corporations see 1 J. DAvis, EssAYs
IN THE Ewawm HIsToRY oF FoREGN CoponAxroNs, (1905); Baldwin, American
Business Corporations Before 1786, 8 AM. IST. REv. 449 (1903).
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ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws, which re-examined and rejected
many of the earlier doctrines of Beale and the first Restatement, the
proper law of a corporation remains substantially the same. Although
the present draftsmen are thoroughly aware of the erosion of rigid
conflict of laws axioms in contract, torts, divorce and other conflict
of law matters, they have concluded that uniformity and certainty
dictate that the internal affairs of a corporation should still be gov-
erned by the law of the state of incorporation. This concept of a
unifying law is somewhat gingerly treated in the Restatement (Sec-
ond); after defining domicile, the comment states that:
when a domicil is assigned to a corporation, it is always in the state of
incorporation. No useful purpose, however, is served by assigning a domi-
cil to a corporation. Most of the uses which the concept of domicil serves
for individuals . .. are inapplicable to corporations. . . . But unlike an
individual, a corporation has a state of incorporation. This state may tax
the corporation, exercise judicial jurisdiction over it and regulate its corporate
activities. It is both inaccurate and unnecessary to explain the existence of
these powers on the ground that the corporation has its domicil in the
state of its incorporation. 17
After disavowing the concept and language of domicile the Restate-
ment (Second) enunciates the following rationale with respect to or-
ganic structure and internal administration:
The efficient operation of a corporation as an entity, as well as the obvious
desirability of affording uniform treatment to directors, officers and stock-
holders, require that such acts be governed by a single law. It would be
impracticable, for example, if the law governing the declaration of a dividend
or the funds out of which the dividend can be paid varied according to
where the directors happened to meet when they declared it. Acts of
this sort are governed by the local law of the state of incorporation. 18
Such matters of internal affairs are, of course, distinguished from the
rights and liabilities of a corporation with respect to third persons,
which are to be governed by the same law which would have con-
trolled if the particular transaction had involved an individual and
not a corporation. 19 The Restatement (Second) does, however, note
that there is a possibility of a different rule in the case of the pseudo-
foreign corporation, with respect to which opinion is withheld; how-
ever, the phrasing of the comment suggests disapproval of such a
variant.
20
17. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CoNFucT OF LAWS, § 11, comment 1 at 59 (Pro-
posed Official Draft 1967. See Francis, The Domicile of a Corporation, 38 YALE
L.J. 335, 357. Compare 3 ALI PROCEEDNcs 226-31 (1925) (comments of W. Cook).
18. RESTATEMENT SECOND OF CoNFracr OF LAws, § 166a, comment a (65 Tent.
Draft No. 7, 1962).
19. Id. § 166.
20. Id. § 166, caveat 1 at 67, reading as follows: "The Institute expresses no
opinion whether questions involving the organic structure or internal administration
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
II. CAN Tim HOST STATE IMPOSE DOMEsTIC LAW ON
FoxEIGN CORPORATIONS?
The first conceptual hurdle which had to be overcome with respect
to foreign corporations was the metaphysical difficulty of recognizing
that a legal entity-an artificial and fictitious being-created by one
sovereign state could exist in the territory of another sovereign.2'
By virtue of various degrees of philosophical esotericism, it soon be-
came established doctrine throughout the United States that corpora-
tions chartered by one state could be recognized for purposes of doing
business in other states.22
of a corporation will always be determined in accordance with the local law of the
state of incorporation in situations where the corporation is incorporated in one state,
but does all, or nearly all, of its business in a second state, and where all, or nearly
all, of the corporation's shareholders reside in the second state. In such a situation,
the second state is the state of greatest interest. On the other hand, predictability and
uniformity of result can best be attained by application of the local law of the state
of incorporation in all cases involving the organic structure or internal administration
of a corporation. Existing authority does not permit the making of any definite state-
ment as to whether application of the local law of the state where a corporation does
all, or nearly all, of its business and where all, or nearly all, of its shareholders reside,
is ever justified and, if so, in what circumstances and with respect to what issues."
21. W. MuxRhEE, LAw OF FoREIGN CORPORATIONS 2 (1893): "It was said by
Chief Justice Marshall, in a much-quoted opinion, that 'a corporation is an artificial
being, invisible, intangible and existing only in contemplation of law.' Dartmouth
College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 250, 303 (1819). It follows that, strictly
speaking, a corporation can have no legal existence beyond the boundaries of the
State from which it receives its charter; for laws, ex proprio vigore, have no extra-
territorial force."
"It is, however, a principle of the law of nations that, in the absence of any positive
rule afflrming, denying, or restraining the operation of foreign laws, courts will,
through comity, presume the tacit adoption of them by their own government, unless
repugnant to its policy and interests. By an application of this rule, the legal existence
and corporate capacity of foreign companies are now universally recognized."
See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (19 Pet.) 443 (1839); YouNG, FoinAGN
CoXANrEs AN OTrnM Conr'OATrONS (1912).
22. On early corporate theory, see generally Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
168 (1868); Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 443 (1839); cf., Troy &
N. C. Mining Co. v. Snow Lumber Co., 173 N.C. 593 (1917).
Four cardinal principles "which have had a profound effect upon American legal
theory on the subject of foreign corporations" are set forth, with the clarity and sue-
cinctuess characteristic of this casebook, in E. Cnz ANi, E. GmisWOLD, W. RErE &
M. ROSENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONFLICT OF LAWS 1007 (5th ed. 1964).
They are:
"(1) A corporation, being a creature of law, cannot exist outside the boundaries of
the state of incorporation. (2) Being a creature of law, a corporation can nowhere
exercise powers not granted it either by its charter or by the general laws of the
state of incorporation. (3) A state is under no obligation to adhere to the doctrine
of comity and hence has the power not only to refuse recognition to the foreign
corporation but also to prevent the corporation from acting within its territory ...
(4) The fourth principle, largely complementary to the third, is that a state is under
no obligation to accord a foreign corporation the privileges which are enjoyed by its
individual citizens."
[ VoL. 21
FOREIGN AND LOCAL CORPORATE POLICY
The magnetism of the state of incorporation and the automatic
reference to the sovereignty of the chartering state was, however, so
strong that until a few decades ago many courts took the position that
a dispute with respect to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation
was outside the jurisdiction of any state other than the state of in-
corporation. Comparatively recently this rigid position of lack of
jurisdiction was replaced by the slightly more flexible doctrine that
a court should, in its discretion, and as a matter of comity and def-
erence, refuse to entertain such a suit.m This refusal to accept juris-
diction over such litigation has now in turn largely given way to ac-
ceptance or rejection of jurisdiction over such suits based upon the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. Most modern courts will probably
accept jurisdiction over such a dispute if the balance of convenience
indicates that it can conveniently be tried by the forum where the
suit is brought.2
Concomitant to the doctrine of recognition by comity of a corpora-
tion chartered by another state was the doctrine that a state need not
allow foreign corporations to do intrastate business within its borders
at all; if a state wants to exclude foreign corporations from its borders
entirely, it still may theoretically do so.2 Since a state is considered
to have an almost unlimited right to exclude foreign corporations,
it is thought to have the corollary right to admit foreign corporations
to do business only on such terms as the state might choose; this
doctrine, that the greater includes the lesser, has been explored in
many decisions and many commentaries.2 This power to impose
conditions upon entering foreign corporations was said to be limited
only to the extent that the conditions sought to be imposed by the
23. Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123, 130 (1933). See generally
Note, Forum Non Conveniens as a Substitute for the Internal Affairs Rule, 58 CoLum.
L. REv. 234 (1958); Note, Forum Non Conveniens and the Internal Affairs of a
Foreign Corporation, 33 Cotunr. L. REv. 492 (1933); Comment, Internal Affairs Rule
in the Federal Courts-The Erie Problem, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 973 (1967); Comment,
The Internal Affairs Doctrine in State Courts, 97 U. PA. L. REv. 666 (1949).
24. Koster v. Lumbermans Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518 (1947). See Lonergan v.
Crucible Steel Co. of America, 37 Ill.2d 599, 229 N.E.2d 536 (1967). Comment, In-
ternal Affairs Rule in the Federal Courts-The Erie Problem, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 973,
975 (1967).
25. Railway Express Co. v. Virginia, 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
26. See Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 CoLum. L.
RL-v. 321 (1935); Henderson, supra note 11, ch. VIII; Merrill, Unconstitutional Con-
ditions, 77 U. PA. L. 11Ev. 879 (1929). See also Comment, Unconstitutional Conditions,
73 H v. L. REv. 1595, 1605-09 (1960).
Hale, particularly, points out, with cogent logic, that the ability to exclude a foreign
corporation should carry with it the ability to exact a waiver of rights, otherwise
granted under the constitution, as a price of admission. He therefore contends that
the state's power to exclude a foreign corporation is not absolute, as it is often asserted
to be, but, in actuality, the power does not exist in the particular circumstances in
which the Supreme Court has held it may not be exerted. Hale, supra at 322.
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state could not be unconstitutional. The primary example of the
unconstitutionality of such a condition would be the attempt to exact,
as a condition of entry, a commitment to abandon recourse to the
federal courts.27 Sometimes it is said that a state cannot impose the
condition that it be allowed to regulate the affairs which the applicant
corporation seeks to conduct outside the territory of the state imposing
the condition;2 but it may have the ability to do even this if such
external control is reasonably calculated to protect a legitimate inter-
est of the state imposing the conditionP The courts have been con-
cerned, in discussing such conditions, lest the state imposing the con-
dition shall exert its jurisdiction and impose its laws in an extraterri-
torial manner. This implies that the laws of the state should deal
only with transactions within its own territorial borders or a legally
permissible juridical extension thereof. "Extraterritoriality" apparently
means the application, improperly, of the laws of a state to acts or
transactions outside of its borders. The application of a state's laws
to an act or a transaction occurring outside the borders of the state but
having significant repercussions and reactions within the state and
involving interests of an important character within the state are
apparently justifiable and consequently, therefore, may not be "extra-
territorial." The extent to which the doctrine of unconstitutional con-
ditions currently protects rights of applicant foreign corporations, and
the extent to which the host state has a legitimate interest which it
may safeguard by appropriate condition have been little explored
during the past twenty-five or thirty years. Occasional references,
mostly dicta, have suggested that the ability of a state to exclude
foreign corporations is virtually unlimited. Moreover, current de-
velopments in the general field of conflict of laws, which recognize
that a state with significant interest in a matter with multistate associ-
ations can constitutionally apply its own law to ensure proper pro-
tection of its interests, will probably have the effect of extending
the ability of a state to impose conditions upon entering foreign cor-
porations.
Now, let us focus upon the assumed situation of a host state with
a public policy concerning the proper fashion of conducting the in-
27. Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922).
28. Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426 (1926). But see Osborn v.
Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940), which in effect overruled the decision in Fidelity without
altering the expressed concern over the extraterritorial reach of conditions.
29. Holmes v. Springfield Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 606 (1940); Osborn
v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322
(1909); BESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF CoNFucT OF LAws, § 172 (1963). See also the
advocacy of the doctrine of reasonableness as a basis for the sustaining of conditions
in Watson v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954); State v. State
Mut. Life Assurance Co., 163 Tex. 240, 353 S.W.2d 412 (1962).
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ternal administration of a corporation, which it wishes to enforce
upon foreign corporations. Suppose the legislature of the state has
determined that all foreign corporations seeking to do business with-
in the state must comply with local rules for conducting corporate
affairs, in the same manner as required of a domestic corporation.
Does the present state of the law permit a state to do so, and if it
does, by what means? This could probably be achieved by denying
qualification to all foreign corporations seeking to do intrastate busi-
ness and requiring them to re-incorporate as domestic corporations
under the local corporation law. This kind of requirement has been
sustained in Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. Virginia;30 but there
the corporation had a type of public utility responsibility which pre-
sumably gave the state a particular justification for exerting unusual
levels of control. Whether, in the light of modern commercial affairs
and the present free migration of business, such a rule would be
broadly sustained as to all foreign corporations has not been tested.
It is possible that different results would follow depending upon the
nature and character of the corporation, though there is no suggestion
in the cases that the principle of the Railway Express case is not a
broad and general one.
Another device for control over foreign corporations is to demand
as a condition of entry that the applicant corporation agree to be
bound by specified provisions (with respect to which there is pre-
sumably a strong public policy) of the state's domestic corporation
act. Although such an imposition of conditions is less pervasive and
drastic than the requirement of domestic re-incorporation, it is simi-
larly premised on the assumption that the state has power to exclude
a foreign corporation entirely. The prime example of this kind of
statutory requirement is set forth in the New York Business Corpora-
tion Act,3' which requires all foreign corporations of a certain charac-
ter to be subject to certain specific domestic provisions.
There has been much academic discussion concerning the possi-
bility that the full faith and credit clause of the United States Consti-
tution may require a state to give full faith and credit to the corpora-
tion statute of the incorporating state and refrain from applying the
law of the host state to matters provided for in the statute pursuant
to which the entity was chartered.32 For a time in the 1930's, it ap-
peared that the Supreme Court of the United States might well
30. 282 U.S. 440 (1931).
31. N.Y. Bus. Coiu'. LAw (McKinney 1963).
32. Latty, supra note 15, at 164-66; Baraf, The Foreign Corporation-A Problem in
Choice-of-Law Doctrine, 33 BROOxLYN L. REV. 219, 240 et seq (1967); Reese & Kauf-
man, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact of Full
Faith and Credit, 58 CoLUM. L. REv. 1118 (1958).
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interpret the United States Constitution to be a compulsory unifier
of the law of multistate transactions and that the due process and
the full faith and credit clauses would be utilized to effect such unifi-
cation.- The passage by Congress in 1948 of the Act, which defined
statutes as public records, gave further impetus to the expanding
recognition of the full faith and credit clause as a broad mandate.
The possibility that the full faith and credit clause might require all
states to observe the requirements of the corporation statutes of the
chartering state is raised by the decision of the United States Su-
preme Court in Order of United Commercial Travelers of America
v. Wolfe.34 In that case an insurance contract, entered into in North
Dakota by an insured who was a member of a fraternal organization
chartered in Ohio, sought to apply the law of the State of North
Dakota to nullify a short contractual period of limitations for assert-
ing claims; this period, invalid under North Dakota law, was per-
mitted under the law of Ohio. The Supreme Court upheld the shorter
period contained in the insurance policy, on the ground that the full
faith and credit clause required that recognition be given to the law
of Ohio (the state of incorporation) on such matters. The Court felt
that it was necessary that one central law be uniformly applied in
connection with such intimate relationships as were involved in a
fraternal benefit society. The notion that there is in reality a close
relationship between individuals who join and become insured in any
of the large fraternal benefit societies and that such relationship is
any more intimate or less commercial than the relationship of policy
holders in any other major mutual life insurance society is probably
specious. The precedent set by the Wolfe case could be made ap-
plicable, upon similar reasoning concerning the necessity of unity,
to ordinary commercial stock corporations as well as incorporated
fraternal benefit societies.3
Recent developments in the field of conflict of laws have rendered
the precedent value of the Wolfe case highly dubious, even with re-
spect to fraternal benefit societies. Even if Wolfe is still good law in
the narrow situation in which it was promulgated, it is highly unlikely
that it will be extended to general business corporations.3 Moreover,
33. See Cheatham, Federal Control of Conflict of Laws, 6 VAND. L. REV. 581 (1953).
34. 331 U.S. 586 (1947). See also Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World
v. Blin, 305 U.S. 66 (1938); Modern Woodmen of America v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544
(1925); Supreme Council of the Royal Arcanum v. Green, 237 U.S. 531 (1915).
35. See dissent of Mr. Justice Black in Order of United Commercial Travellers of
America v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586, 641 (1947). But see remarks of Baraf, supra note
32, at 244, asserting that distinction between the corporation and the fraternal benefit
society is an easy one.
36. In Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964), the Court rejected the Wolfe
case doctrine in a commercial stock company insurance case. It should also be noted
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even if it were held that the full faith and credit clause is applicable
to the corporation statute of the state of incorporation, it is doubtful
whether such a holding in itself would have the effect of inhibiting
another state, which has a valid and substantial interest to safeguard,
from applying its own rule of law, even if contrary to that of the
incorporating state. The long line of Supreme Court cases in the field
of workmen's compensation has made it clear that, even in a situa-
tion where an employment relationship would customarily be gov-
erned by the worlmaen's compensation act of the state where the
employment contract was entered into, the full faith and credit clause
does not require that statute to be followed by a state which has a
substantial interest in the transaction and seeks to apply its own law.
Similarly, it seems reasonably clear that the full faith and credit
clause does not bar a state, which has a substantial connection with
a foreign corporation, from applying its law to the internal affairs of
a foreign corporation in the manner, for example, set forth in Chapter
13 of the New York Business Corporation Act of 1961.
Supreme Court doctrine, with respect to the necessity of a sub-
stantial interest in the transaction, raises the question of whether the
full faith and credit clause might allow a state to apply its law to the
internal affairs of some foreign corporations but not to certain other
corporations. If the rationale circumscribing the impact of the full
faith and credit clause is predicated upon the nature of the state's
connection with the transaction, then the significance and weight
of the interest of the host state would have to be demonstrated in
order to justify the application of its law to the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation. If that were the case, the host state might be
able to apply its local law, notwithstanding the full faith and credit
clause, to the pseudo-foreign corporation or the quasi-foreign corpora-
tion, but probably not in the case of the genuine foreign corporation
or the national corporation. If, however, the full faith and credit clause
is not applicable to enforce observance of a foreign corporation
statute or the charter of a foreign corporation-as would appear to
be the situation in the light of the inapplicability of the Wolfe doc-
trine-then the host state can apply its domestic law to foreign cor-
that the Wolfe case, like all five-to-four decisions, rests on a somewhat precarious
foundation. See Order of Commercial Travellers of America v. Duncan, 221 F.2d 703
(6th Cir. 1955); Cheatham, supra note 33, at 601. Compare, Broderick v. Rosner,
294 U.S. 629 (1935), with Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912) which require
a state to give full faith and credit to administrative or judicial determinations by the
state of incorporation of assessments of liability of shareholders.
37. Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial
Accident Comm., 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident




porations as a condition to entry, in such manner and to such extent
as it chooses. It should be noted that the New York Corporation
Act in effect prior to 1963 (when the present statute became effec-
tive) made certain specified provisions of the corporation act appli-
cable to all foreign corporations, without exception and without re-
gard to the nature of the corporation's New York activities.
38
The present New York statute avoids any uncertainty concerning
its application by virtue of its built-in definition of a sufficient New
York interest. The statute is applicable by its terms only to corpora-
tions which do fifty per cent or more of their business within the
State of New York, and then only if the corporation's securities are
not listed on a national securities exchange. These specifications for
the applicability of New York rules to a foreign corporation discrimi-
nate between different kinds of foreign corporations in a manner
somewhat similar to the differentiation inherent in the four categories
of foreign corporations heretofore described. The requirement of a
percentage of business in the State of New York makes it clear that
local law will not be applied to a corporation unless it has significant
operations within the state, thus eliminating from local control the
genuine foreign corporation. The provision that the New York law
will not apply if the corporation's stock is listed on a national se-
curities exchange withholds local control from corporations which,
by that criterion, are deemed national in character (apparently on
the theory that corporations whose securities are so listed have a wide
dispersion of shareholders and a meaningful multistate character).
Theoretically, it would be possible to have a pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion, incorporated outside of New York, doing all of its business in
New York, with all of its stockholders resident there, but listed on a
national securities exchange, which is free from the requirement of
observing the New York Corporation Act.39  The significance of
the New York Act is that it prescribes specific criteria to measure
38. For comparable statutes imposing upon directors of foreign corporations the
same duties as are required of directors of domestic corporations, see Aiuz. REv. STAT.
§§ 10-196, 10-197 (1956); MAss. ANN. LAWS, ch. 181, § 14 (1955); Mica. STAT. ANN.
§ 21.95 (1963).
For a discussion of the abortive concept of the "domiciled foreign corporation" which
was included in the New York Business Corporation Act of 1961 and then removed
by amendment before it became effective, see Comment, Domestic Regulation of For-
eign Corporations, 47 ConNELL L.Q. 273 (1962).
39. Even those provisions of the New York Act relating to foreign corporations can
be avoided by organizing the main corporation as a Delaware entity and having the
New York enterprise carried on by a New York subsidiary of the Delaware corporation
holding company. The proposed but abortive North Carolina provision relating to pseudo-
foreign corporations sought to close this loophole. See N.C. Sess. Laws 1955, ch 55,
§§ 135-36; Latty, Some General Observations on the New Business Corporation Law
of New York, 11 BUFFALo L.J. 591, 610 (1962).
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the interest of the state, as a condition to applying local law to
the internal affairs or a foreign corporation. Whether the criteria
selected by New York are as broad or as comprehensive as they might
constitutionally be is unlikely. Another state, following the same
theory of defining the area in which it desires to have its local policy
applied, might select other criteria, thereby embracing different cate-
gories of foreign corporations. Interestingly enough, the New York
statute imposing its domestic law upon foreign corporations never
seems to have been challenged upon constitutional grounds.
Another difficult question remains. In the absence of express statu-
tory directive, can the host state apply its own domestic law to
govern the internal affairs of a foreign corporation as a matter of
conflict of laws doctrine?40 Seldom will the legislature of the forum
specify whether, for example, the tort law of the forum should be
applicable to a tort taking place in another state; the question of
whether the local law should be so applied is determined by a court
in accordance with the forum's conflict of laws doctrine. The court
will determine the "proper law of the tort." If the court followed the
first Restatement, the applicable rule would be derived from the tort
law of the place of the accident. If it followed more modem doctrine,
it would analyze the factual situation before deciding whether the
law of the place of the accident or the law of the forum or the law
of some other state should apply. The ultimate decision will depend
upon the "preponderance of contacts" in the transaction or its "center
of gravity" or the character, distribution and relative importance of
the connections with and the interests of the various states involved
in the multistate situation. For some particular purposes and with
respect to certain parties involved in such an accident, the law of
the state of the accident might apply; for other purposes and other
parties the law of the state of the forum might apply. All decisions
in such an action would be made on the basis of varying and
diverse criteria, depending upon the particular judge and the school
of thought which he might follow. A common factor present in all
such instances would be the flexibility available to the judge in se-
lecting the proper law for the particular transaction; if the modern
judge does not select the law of a state which has no substantial con-
tact whatsoever with the transaction, beyond being the forum state
(as in Home Insurance Company v. Dick4l1 ), he is probably not consti-
40. For an interesting study of time conflicts, and some analogies to territorial con-
flicts, in the law of corporations, see McNulty, Corporations and the Intertemporal
Conflict of Laws, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 12, 16, 20 (1967).
41. 281 U.S. 397 (1930). See also Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine
Land Co., 292 U.S. 143 (1934); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Brown, 234 U.S. 542
(1914).
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tutionally inhibited from selecting any law that he chooses. And it
is not even certain that the limiting doctrine of Home Insurance Com-
pany v. Dick has not itself been eroded.4
If this flexibility exists in the selection of the proper law of a tort
(and also of the proper law of contract, workmen's compensation,
etc.), then one might question whether a similar flexibility should not
also be possible, as a matter of choice of law doctrine, in a dispute
involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. The usual
holding in cases involving the internal affairs of a foreign corpora-
tion applies the law of the state of incorporation, without even ques-
tioning its necessity or desirability. It should not be inappropriate
to inquire whether the law governing corporate conduct should be
determined by the same processes of judgment and selection used in
other questions of conflict of laws and to examine the possibility that
the law of the forum might be applied to internal corporate disputes
under certain circumstances. It may well be that the practical con-
siderations pressing toward unity of rule are so essential in the cor-
porate situation that the court of a host state should be unwilling to
impose its own law and should instead select the law of the state of
incorporation. Whether such a determination is mandatory is a separate
question. However, practicability and unity of rule are usually merely
factors which should bear upon the appropriateness of the selection
of law; the fact that they may turn out to be decisive should not
preclude a court from considering the subject. It would be logically
compelling, for example, to have the measure of damages for all per-
sons killed in the same airplane crash to be the same; however, under
the doctrine of the Kilberg,43 Pearson,44 and Van Duse 45 cases, it has
been determined to be permissible, as a matter of conflict of laws doc-
trine to have such a damage rule vary with different factors of forum,
residence, place of purchase of ticket, and the like. If the proper law
of a tort, a contract, marriage, support, custody, and divorce can in
many respects be fractionalized and diverse, must the law governing
the internal affairs of a corporation be inexorably the same, regardless
of where the corporation is acting, what the particular dispute entails,
and what the respective interests of the states involved may be?
Probably the leading decision on the question of applying the law
of the host state to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is
42. See Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
43. Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 9 N.Y.2d 34, 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d
133 (1961).
44. Pearson v. Northeast Airlines Inc., 309 F.2d 553 (2d cir. (1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 912 (1963).
45. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
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German-American Coffee Company v. Diehl,46 in which the court
held that the New York statutory provision forbidding payment of
dividends out of capital could be enforced against directors of a sol-
vent New Jersey corporation at the instance of a stockholder in a
derivative suit. The New Jersey statute also forbade payment of
dividends under these circumstances but it vested the remedy in the
company's stockholders and not in the corporation itself. Judge Car-
dozo, speaking for the court of appeals, took the position that the
offense involved was in violation of the provisions of the New York
statute, which created new duties and new rights. He stated:
A foreign corporation not engaged in interstate commerce may be excluded
altogether. [Phoenix Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. MeMaster, 237 U.S. 63]; if
admitted, it may be subjected to conditions. . . . In these days, when
countless corporations, organized on paper in neighboring states, live and
move and have their being in New York, a sound public policy demands
that our legislature be invested with this measure of control.47
Although the dividend under attack in the case was improper under
the laws of both New York and New Jersey, the New Jersey law
would not have permitted a derivative action in connection with this
dividend; this fact gives additional force to Judge Cardozo's state-
ment that the right sued upon was founded upon New York law,
rather than the law of the state of incorporation.
This case does not involve a common law choice of conflicts rules;
furthermore, the result can be, in part, justified on the ground that
New York creditors were supposedly protected by this statutory pro-
vision which required corporations to maintain their capital unim-
paired for the protection of creditors. It could thus be contended that
this intervention really involved the protection of outside third parties.
The rationale of the decision would therefore not necessarily extend
to justify application of New York law to a foreign corporation either
in the absence of express statutory provision or to an internal dispute
in which the rights of creditors were not involved. It is interesting,
in this latter context, to note that the draftsmen of the current New
York Business Corportion Act did not feel inhibited in their applica-
tion of New York law to foreign corporations by any assumed need
to protect an outside third party's interest. The New York statute
applies explicitly to matters involving only shareholders and not
creditors or other third parties as, for example, in connection with
(a) the right of stockholders to inspect corporate records, (b) the
obligation to disclose information to shareholders, (c) the procedure
to enforce a shareholder's right to receive payment for shares, or (d)
46. 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915).
47. 216 N.Y. 57, 64, 109 N.E. 875, 877 (1915).
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the provision for indemnification of officers and directors. It should
also be noted that the German-American Coffee Company was not
so entirely connected with New York and so minimally connected
with New Jersey that it would fall in the pseudo-foreign corporation
category.
A situation involving the application of the New York prohibition
against the payment of dividends out of capital came up for con-
sideration in International Ticket Scale Corp. v. United States,41 where,
unlike the German-American Coffee Company case, such a payment
was permitted by the state of incorporation. The court, in passing
upon the availability of a credit for the purposes of the tax on un-
distributed profits, held that the New York statute prohibited such
a dividend because the statute applied "to foreign corporations the
same prohibitions against unauthorized dividends that were imposed
upon domestic corporations."49 The Court of Appeals therefore re-
versed the district court which had "rested its decision merely on a
reference to 'the reasoning' of Borg v. International Silver Co ...
where the court thought the Diehl principle applicable only when
the dividends were also unlawful under the laws of the state of in-
corporation."
50
A later case which grapples with the choice of law problems more
directly is Mansfield Hardwood Lumber Company v. Johnson,51 in
which a shareholder in a Delaware corporation brought a derivative
action for rescission of the sale of stock to his corporation. He alleged
a fraudulent conspiracy to acquire the stock and to liquidate the
corporate assets at an inordinate profit to the remaining stockholders,
following the purchase of the minority shares. The court stated that
Delaware, the state of incorporation, imposed no fiduciary duty on
the part of officers and directors or majority shareholders in buying
stock from other shareholders. Despite the general rule which looks
to the law of the state of incorporation to determine obligations be-
tween officers, directors, and shareholders, the court applied Louisiana
law, stating that:
When, however, the situation is such as here, where neither the charter
nor the statutory laws of the incorporating state are applicable, and all
contact points are in the forum, we believe that the laws of the forum
should govern. 52
The only direct precedent cited by the Mansfield court was Blazer
48. 165 F.2d 358 (2d Cir., 1948).
49. Id. at 359.
50. Id.
51. 268 F.2d 317 (5th Cir. 1959).
52. Id. at 321.
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v. Black,53 in which a former stockholder of a dissolved corporation
sued its former president for damages, charging fraudulent conversion
of the plaintiff's stock prior to dissolution. The corporation was
chartered in Illinois but all other contacts were in Kansas. The court
held that the Kansas law governed and imposed a fiduciary duty upon
the director, without even discussing the law of Illinois. Both the
Mansfield and the Blazer cases involved pseudo-foreign corporations
and the imposition of liability in situations where liability under the
law of the host state would not result in any serious conflict with
procedure prescribed by the statute of the incorporating state and
where there was no problem of double liability.-4
An especially significant recent decision on this subject is Western
Airlines, Inc. v. Sobieski.55 Western Airlines originally had been a
California corporation; in 1929, by exchanging shares with a Dela-
ware corporation created for that purpose, it re-incorporated in
Delaware. In 1956, the Delaware corporation sought to amend its
charter to eliminate cumulative voting. The California Corporations
Commissioner took the position that this alteration of the rights
of the common stockholders constituted a sale of new stock in
exchange for the old stock under the Corporate Securities Law (even
though no exchange of certificates was contemplated) and that
such a sale necessitated the issuance of a permit under the Corpora-
tions Code. Western then applied for a permit, which the Com-
missioner denied on the ground that the proposed change was in-
equitable and unfair. The findings made in the hearings included
the fact that Western's business in California was of a substantial
nature and that California residents were the holders of about fifty
per cent6 of Western's outstanding shares. Western argued that:
53. 196 F.2d 139 (10th Cir. 1952).
54. The court in the Mansfield case stated: "[W]hat has been said concerning the
choice of laws to determine the duty owed by officers, directors, or majority stock-
holders to the minority stockholders may not be necessary for the disposition of this
case. That is true because, as will be seen, the broad scope of fraud in Louisiana
covers situations where the law imposes an obligation on the party with superior
knowledge to disclose facts within his knowledge to the other and to deal in an
atmosphere of trust and confidence." 268 F.2d 317, 322 (5th Cir. 1959).
Consequently, it might be argued that the statement in the Mansfield case concern-
ing choice of law is dictum and that the case involves what Professor Currie calls "a
false conflict."
55. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719 (1961). For later decisions in the
same chain of litigation, see Western Airlines, Inc. v. Schutzbank, 258 Cal. App. 2d 291,
66 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1968), and People v. Western Airlines, Inc., 258 Cal. App. 2d 286,
66 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1968).
56. The precise percentage of California shareholders is not shown. Approximately
fifty per cent of the shares were held in brokers' names. Of the fifty per cent held in
individual names, about half were owned by Californians. The Commissioner therefore
assumed that a like percentage applied to the ownership of the securities held in
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(1) the filing of the charter amendment in Delaware was the last act
to effect the change in voting rights contemplated by the charter
amendment and that any issuance of shares affected thereby took
place outside California; and (2) the action of the Commissioner
was extraterritorial and beyond the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
and of the State of California. The court upheld the Commissioner's
action, stating, in part:
It would appear that the provisions of the Corporate Securities Act here
before us are a proper exercise of legislative discretion in requiring that
corporate dealings with residents of this state be authorized by the Com-
missioner of Corporations, particularly where such corporation does a sub-
stantial amount of business within the state, and the act is not violative of
the constitutional clauses of equal protection, contract, due process and
full faith and credit if such legislative enactments operate equally upon
such foreign corporations and domestic corporations in this state.57
Western's additional contention of unfair classification was rejected
by the court:
Western complains that the commissioner, since the institution of this
action, has created a new class of foreign corporation called a pseudo-
foreign corporation, and urges that such definition of such corporation is
mere fiat; that the commissioner has usurped the function of Legislature
which has seen fit to divide corporations into only two classes-domestic
and foreign; and that the commissioner has seen fit by his arbitrary defini-
tions to create a third. Western's position in this respect is not well taken.
The commissioner did not create any new class of corporation. He merely
named a class of corporations which has, in effect, existed for many years,
one with its technical domicile outside of this state but one which exercises
most of its corporate vitality within this state. Unless it can be said that
the Corporation Commissioner's characterization of such corporation as
'pseudo-foreign' is arbitrary, it would appear to be a matter well within
his administrative discretion. The concept of a pseudo-foreign corporation
as defined by the commissioner and the well established concept of 'com-
mercial domicile' of a corporation appear to us to be founded upon reality.58
The court did not even cite the earlier cases of Pinney v. Nelson 9 and
Thomas v. Mathiessen,60 sustaining the imposition of personal liability
upon shareholders of foreign corporations pursuant to California stat-
ute, despite the fact that the shareholders were protected against
such liability by the law of the state of incorporation. These cases,
unlike the Western Airlines case but somewhat like the German-
American Coffee Company case involved relationships between the
brokers' names. On that assumption, approximately fifty per cent of all shares would
be beneficially owned by California residents.
57. 191 Cal. App. 2d 399, 411, 12 Cal. Rptr. 719, 727 (1961).
58. Id. at 412, 12 Cal. Rptr. at 727.
59. 183 U.S. 144 (1901).
60. 232 U.S. 221 (1914).
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corporation and creditors, rather than internal relationships of par-
ticipants in the corporate enterprise.
The only case relied upon by the court in the Western Airlines case
was State ex rel. Weede v. Iowa Southern Utilities Company.61 There
an Iowa shareholder in a Delaware corporation claimed that a pro-
posed recapitalization of the corporation was unfair and inequitable.
The enterprise was initially incorporated in Maine, where it did busi-
ness for seven years, after which it reincorporated in Delaware; there-
upon it qualified as a foreign corporation in Iowa, where all of its
property and business was located at the time of litigation. The Iowa
Supreme Court proceeded to judge the matter in accordance with
Iowa doctrine, citing only German-American Coffee Company v.
Dieh 62 and stating:
Neither justice nor the practical necessities of the modem business world
can lend a sympathetic ear to the claim of a foreign corporation, with all
its business in Iowa-plants, records, officers, etc.-that under its articles
issued to it by the authority of the foreign state, it can come into our
state and violate its statutory requirements.6
The Weede case is not a holding on strict common law choice of
law but may, like German-American Coffee Company, be an applica-
tion of choice of law required by the Iowa statute, which expressly
applied to foreign corporations engaged in utility activities. Similarly,
Western Airlines may not be a common law choice of law case of
any significant precedential value because of the unique character of
California law. "Sale" is so broadly defined in the California Corporate
Securities Law that it can include almost any modification of the
rights of California shareholders, at least by charter amendment.
Other state securities laws do not have so broad a reach. It is inter-
esting to note that in California the Corporations Code and the
Corporate Securities Law are both administered by the Corporations
Commissioner. In most states the corporation statute and the se-
curities or blue-sky laws are separate, and separately administered.
Theoretically, California's broad definition of sale may also extend
to other kinds of actions altering the rights of shareholders by means
other than charter amendments. Rights of shareholders could, for
example, be affected substantially by a provision in a contract or
indenture restricting payment of dividends. Caution and adminis-
trative practice have led many attorneys to seek permits from the
61. 231 Iowa 784, 2 N.W.2d 372 (1942), affd. sub. nom. State ex rel Weede v.
Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 31 N.W.2d 853 (1948), cert. denied, sub. nom. Bechtel v.
Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918 (1949).
62. 216 N.Y. 57, 109 N.E. 875 (1915).
63. State ex rel. Weede v. Bechtel, 239 Iowa 1298, 1320-21, 31 N.W.2d 853, 865
(1948), cert. denied, sub. nom. Bechtel v. Thatcher, 337 U.S. 918 (1949).
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California Commissioner even in such situations.64 The rationale of
the Corporation Commissioner in the Western Airlines case could
even be extended to control charter amendments of a large corpora-
tion with only a few shareholders in California; any charter amend-
ment constitutes a sale, and there is no exemption in California for
sales to a small number of persons.
The Corporation Commissioner in Western Airlines regarded West-
ern as a pseudo-foreign corporation. By the definitions hereinabove
used, Western would be a quasi-foreign corporation, not a pseudo-
foreign corporation. It was incorporated in Delaware, had about fifty
per cent of its shares in the hands of non-California owners, and did
a substantial portion of its business outside the State of California;
it was not-like the corporations involved in the Mansfield and the
Blazer cases-totally connected with the host state, except for the
formality of incorporation. It may also be noted in passing that were
Western to be measured by the criteria of the New York Business
Corporation Act, it would have been exempted from the application
of that Act because Western's securities are listed on a national se-
curities exchange. The Western Airlines case enunciates its doctrine
in terms of pseudo-foreign corporations only, but then applies it to a
quasi-foreign corporation. Literally, the Corporate Securities Law
would bring charter amendments by all corporations within the juris-
diction of the California Corporations Commissioner. Whether Cali-
fornia courts would hold that the Corporations Commissioner had the
same jurisdiction under the terms of California statutes if a national
corporation or a genuine foreign corporation were involved is un-
certain. Whether they would hold that an exercise of such jurisdic-
tion, even if specifically conferred upon the California Corporations
Commissioner, is appropriate as a matter of conflict of laws or is
64. Small, Changes in Rights, Preferences, Privileges and Restrictions on Outstand-
ing Securities Under the California Corporate Securities Law, 14 HAsnNcs L.J. 94, 104
et. seq. (1962). See also Dahlquist, Regulation and Civil Liability Under the California
Corporate Securities Act: II, 34 CALIw. L. PEv. 344, 350 (1946). The proposed Cali-
fornia Corporate Securities Law of 1968, now under consideration, contemplates rather
sweeping revision of the California statute. In connection with the problem of pseudo-
foreign corporations, the proposed law provides an exemption from the need for an
issuer incorporated outside of California to obtain a California permit in connection
with recapitalization or reorganization "unless a certain percentage of California share-
holders have California addresses of record. In the case of a recapitalization, 25 per cent
of the outstanding shares 'directly or indirectly affected substantially and adversely
by such' recapitalization must have record addresses in California [1 25103(b)]. As
to a reorganization, exemption is provided unless at least 25 per cent of the investors
who will receive shares have California residence addresses [H 25103(c)]. Excluded
from the calculation of the total class to which the 25 per cent is to be applied are
securities held of record by brokers-dealers and securities controlled by one person
who controls 50 per cent or more of the applicable class." Sterling, California Corporate
Securities Law of 1968, 23 Bus. LAw. 645, 651 (1968).
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permissible as a matter of constitutional law remains undecided.6
The courts in a number of jurisdictions, even without clear statu-
tory mandate, have held that domestic corporation law should be
applied to require a foreign corporation doing business within the
state to make the corporate books and records available to a stock-
holder for inspection, even though such a right would not have been
granted under the law of the state of incorporation.66 To say, how-
ever, that a suit by a stockholder against the corporation or against
its officers and directors to make available corporate records does not
involve the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is plainly not
true. By any reasonable definition of internal affairs, a dispute be-
tween the shareholders and the entity or its management, in the vital
preliminary skirmish before the battle for eventual control, is not only
central to the affairs of the corporation but can in no way be said
to be a non-internal matter; it is between persons entirely within
the corporate structure, and does not involve the rights of third parties
against the corporation. It can, of course, be argued that this type
of dispute, though involving the internal affairs of the corporation,
is of the sort in which the corporate operation will not be upset or
obstructed even if the host state requires exhibiting records to share-
holders. This analysis of these cases would admit that the internal
affairs of a foreign corporation are involved but would deny that this
type of dispute would cause difficulty if local law of the host state
were applied. Whatever the rationale, the result is that in such suits
the courts have not been reluctant to apply domestic law, even though
it may involve the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
One of the most recent cases involving such a problem is McCormick
v. Statler Hotels Delaware Corp.,6 in which an Illinois stockholder
65. A very interesting recent case impinging upon the problem of the role of the
full faith and credit clause with respect to the application of the forum's law to a
dispute involving the internal affairs of a foreign corporation and with respect to the
choice of law problems is O'Brien v. Virginia-Carolina Chem. Corp,, 44 N.J. 25, 206
A.2d 878 (1965) and its counterpart case under the name of O'Brien v. Socony
Mobil Oil Co., 207 Va. 707, 152 S.E.2d 278 (1967). The two cases are commented
upon at length in Gibson & Freeman, A Decade of the Model Business Corporation
Act in Virginia, 53 VA. L. Rv. 1396, 1405 et seq (1967).
66. These cases often state that this type of dispute is either not a matter of the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation or the type of internal affairs matter which
can properly be handled in the courts of a state which did not issue the charter.
FLETcmm, 17 CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIvATE CoRPoPATioNs (perm. ed. 1967)
§ 2229. See Loveman v. Tutwiler Inv. Co., 240 Ala. 424, 199 So. 854 (1941);
McCormick v. Statler Hotel Delaware Corp., 30 Ill. 2d 86, 195 N.E.2d 172 (1963);
State v. Sterns Tire & Tube Co., 202 S.W. 459 (Mo. App. 1918); Donna v. Abbotts
Dairies, Inc., 399 Pa. 497, 161 A.2d 13 (1960); cf. Toklan Royalty Corp. v. Tiffany,
93 Okla. 120, 122, 141 P.2d 571, 573 (1943), in which the Oklahoma court said that
the foreign corporation "is not, strictly speaking, a foreign corporation with respect to
the question of examination and inspection of its books and records by its stockholders."
67. 30 Ill. 2d 86, 195 N.E.2d 172 (1963), and 55 Il. App. 2d 21 (1963).
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of a Delaware corporation brought action in Illinois against the cor-
poration and its secretary to compel them to permit examination of
the stockholders list and to recover the Illinois statutory penalty of
ten per cent of the value of his stock for unjustified refusal to permit
him to inspect corporate records. The court mentioned, but did not
emphasize, that the secretary was a resident of Illinois. 68 The court
did not refer to the percentage of the defendant's business done with-
in Illinois, or to the number of hotels which it owned in the state,
or to the relative weight of the connections between the corporation
and any of the various states in which it did business. The case was
appealed from the trial court directly to the Illinois Supreme Court
on constitutional grounds; that court transferred the case back to the
appellate court upon finding that no substantial constitutional issue
was presented. The appellate court held for the plaintiff on the ground
that the Illinois Business Corporation Act applied and stated that this
type of dispute did not involve the internal affairs of the corporation.
The court brushed aside the contention that such a holding would
constitute interference in the internal affairs of a foreign corporation
contrary to section 102 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act which
states inter alia: "Nothing in this Act contained shall be construed to
authorize this state to regulate the organization or the internal affairs
of such [foreign] corporation." Upon the initial appeal to the Illinois
Supreme Court, that court had stated:
It is uncontrovertible that the legislature may prescribe reasonable con-
ditions on which foreign corporations, other than those engaged in interstate
commerce or constituting instrumentalities of the Federal government, may
do business in the State . . . and it has been repeatedly held that the
qualification of a foreign corporation in accordance with the statutes per-
mitting its entry into a State constitutes an assent on its part to all
reasonable conditions imposed.69
A subsequent decision by the Supreme Court of Illinois, Lonergan
v. Crucible Steel Co. of America,70 deals with a series of related
matters in a more sophisticated fashion than the McCormick case. A
derivative action had been brought in Illinois by four shareholders
of the corporation, two of whom were Illinois residents, alleging
that the president had entered into a conspiracy with a California
financier to arrange for the merger of Crucible into another corpora-
tion in return for an agreement whereby the president would be re-
tained in office at an increased salary. The complaint also sought to
restrain the use of allegedly deficient proxy material, and to prevent
68. Statler Hotels Delaware Corporation was a national corporation chartered in
Delaware, and not a pseudo-foreign corporation or a quasi-foreign corporation.
69. 30 111. 2d 86, 88, 195 N.E.2d 172, 173 (1963).
70. 37 I1. 2d 599, 229 N.E.2d 536 (1967).
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some forty-six individual defendants from acquiring additional shares
of stock of Crucible and from voting the shares they had already ac-
quired. The Illinois Supreme Court, in a four to three decision, stated
that the question was one not of jurisdiction but of forum non con-
veniens and that there was no other forum which was more convenient
to all concerned than Illinois. Jurisdiction was therefore retained. The
court stated:
In early cases the acceptance or denial of jurisdiction of derivative actions
against foreign corporations turned on what the courts determined was or
was not interference with the internal affairs of the corporation. . . . We
feel that the acceptance or denial of jurisdiction of such actions should be
decided under the doctrine of forum non conveniens and that interference
with the internal affairs of a foreign corporation is only one factor in
determining whether an Illinois court would serve the convenience of the
parties and the ends of justice.71
There was a strong dissent, written by Justice Schaefer, contending
that the balance of convenience indicated that Illinois should refrain
from entertaining jurisdiction of such a case. The dissent stated that,
with the exception of the fact that two Illinois plaintiffs had recently
bought stock in Crucible, Illinois had:
no connection with this case. Crucible is a New Jersey corporation. Its
principal offices and manufacturing facilities are in Pennsylvania, and its
stockholders meetings are required to be held either in New Jersey or in
Pennsylvania. Its connections with Illinois, measured in terms of percentage
of total sales, total assets and total employees located there, are minimal.
None of the conduct of which the plaintiffs complained took place in
Illinois.72
He goes on to say that "Illinois law will govern the rights of the
parties only to the extent that its doctrines of conflicts of laws may
be involved."7
3
The majority did not discuss the question of which law should apply
and concerned itself merely with the question of jurisdiction. Justice
Schaefer's comment concerning application of Illinois law may mean
merely that its conflict of laws doctrines will point to Delaware for
the governing law; it may also indicate that there is some flexibility
as to whether Illinois law may apply in such a dispute, as distinguished
from the mechanical application of the law of the state of incorpora-
tionZ4
71. Id. at 605, 229 N.E.2d at 539.
72. Id. at 613, 229 N.E.2d at 543.
73. Id.
74. Another exercise of power over foreign corporations by host states occurs in
connection with extension of the corporate life of the entity after its dissolution by
the chartering state. Some states, by statute, subject dissolved foreign corporations to
19681]
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In summary, it appears that an interested host state is not bound
by the full faith and credit clause to apply the corporation statute
of a chartering state and that the due process clause would not pre-
vent the application of the local law. There is apparently no consti-
tutional barrier presently raised against such action by the host state;
it also appears within the power of the host state to impose conditions
of entry which require that the foreign corporation be bound by spe-
cified statutory requirements concerning the internal affairs of the cor-
poration. It also appears that the host state has the power-if it wishes
to employ it-to apply its local law to the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation with substantial activities within the state through appli-
cation of choice-of-law principles. There is a paucity of cases which
support this choice-of-law power, and these cases usually do so only
with respect to pseudo-foreign corporations. However, these appear to
be no jurisdictional or constitutional obstacles to such a non-statutory
choice of law determination. A host state could probably also adopt
the broad doctrine of commercial domicile, analogous to that of the
European legal systems, if it chose to do so, so far as constitutional
power is concerned.
III. PuBIuc POLIcY OF THE HOST STATE
The question of the desirability and propriety of application of the
law of the host state to a dispute involving a foreign corporation's
internal affairs is a quite different question from that of its ability
to do so. The decision concerning propriety and desirability rests
fundamentally upon considerations of expediency and public policy;
the latter is based upon the host state's conception of public order,
its evaluation of the importance of its own solution of the problem
under consideration, and the nature of state interests involved.
The concept of public policy in American conflict of laws-as be-
tween the various states of the union-has been minimized as an
"affectation of superior virtue," between jurisdictions with funda-
mentally homogeneous standards of conduct. The usefulness of the
public policy concept has been frequently doubted and often con-
demned as the product of slovenly thinking and as an unacceptable
suit pursuant to the rules of the host state; such requirements are usually imposed as
a condition to entering and doing business within the host state. Thus, says
EmuZw EG, CoNxucr or LAws 68-69 (1959): "The breakdown of the original,
allegedly analytical, rule of 'nonexistence' in conflicts cases is moreover shown by the
fact that a 'public policy' of the forum may be held sufficient to revive the 'dead'
corporation." Moreover, some states are also willing to tamper with the foreign creature
to the extent of conferring upon it the right to exercise a power in the host state which
it did not have in the state of its origin. See Hawkland, Control of Foreign Corporate
Activity by the State of Incorporation, 6 Mrmn L.Q. 41 (1951).
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substitute for careful reasoning and the precise delineation of rules.75
Such criticism is usually directed against decisions which merely rely
upon a broad policy as the basis for refusal to enforce a foreign cause
of action. However, it may be that a careful delineation of the role
of public policy will serve to make it a helpful tool for initiating con-
sideration of the development of a set of relatively narrow rules which
will provide reasonable certainty for utilization of local law of the
host state in the field of foreign corporations. Perhaps a useful entry
into this area of public policy may be found in a consideration of
Hausman v. Buckley,76 which is one of the few cases that has made a
search for the public policy of the host state and discussed whether
such public policy, if ascertained, should be applied to a foreign
corporation. This stockholder's derivative action based on diversity
of citizenship was brought in the District Court of New York on be-
half of a Venezuelan corporation. The threshold issue was whether
a minority stockholder of a Venezuelan corporation could "participate
in its management" by bringing a law suit in the corporation's behalf.
The trial court had stated that a stockholder's ability to bring a
derivative suit was a substantive matter rather than a procedural
one and that the New York conflict of laws rules would therefore
apply; such rules the trial court found, referred to the place of in-
corporation, under whose laws the individual shareholder could not
bring a derivative suit. In a sophisticated and searching opinion by
Judge Kaufman, the court of appeals considered the impact of a
number of conflict of laws rules upon this set of facts and finally
rejected the minority shareholder's derivative action. The court agreed
that the ability to bring a derivative suit was sufficiently important to
the rights of the shareholders to be a substantive matter, even though
the issue seemed to be expressed in procedural terms. The court
recognized that "the 'internal affairs' choice-of-law rule, as applied to
issues peculiar to disputes involving corporations, is well established
and generally followed throughout this country."17 "Moreover," the
court said, "the 'internal affairs' rule has been appli.d repeatedly in
order to determine the fiduciary duty of a foreign corporation's di-
75. See generally EmENzwEiG, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAv § 78 (1967);
GooDRcIr, CoNrucr oF LAWS, §§ 11 & 106 (4th ed. E. Scoles 1964); 2 RABEL, THE
CoNFLIct OF LAWs: A COmPaARATrVE STUY ch. 33 (2nd ed. 1960); STROMBERG,
CoNFLucT OF LAWS 166 & 276 (3rd ed. 1963); Hoff, The Intensity Principle in the
Conflict of Laws, 39 VA. L. REv. 437 (1953); Katzenbach, Conflicts on an Unruly
Horse: Reciprocal Claims and Tolerances in Interstate and International Law, 65 YALE
L.J. 1087 (1956); Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws,
33 YALE L.J. 736 (1924); Nussbaum, Public Policy and the Political Crisis in the
Conflict of Laws, 49 YALE L.J. 1027 (1940); Paulsen & Sovern, Public Policy in the
Conflict of Laws, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 969 (1956).
76. 299 F.2d 696 (2d Cir. 1962).
77. Id. at 702.
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rectors."18 The court pointed out that there was no showing in the
New York decisions that New York would not follow the "internal
affairs" rule, as broadly stated above; the court made no reference
in this connection to the German-American Coffee Company case nor
to the provisions of Chapter 13 of the New York Business Corporation
Act imposing observance of New York law in certain respects upon
foreign corporations.
The appellants argued that New York conflict of laws doctrine is
currently in a state of flux and that rigid rules such as the "internal
affairs" rule are being undermined by New York decisions which are
replacing the older rules in other fields of conflict of laws by a more
flexible mode of choice of law, citing Auten v. Auten19 and Kilberg v.
Northeast Airlines.8 0 The court rejected these contentions, noting that
all the cited cases involved contract or tort questions and that none of
them suggested that the Auten approach has been introduced by New
York tribunals into corporate stockholder litigation. It stated, how-
ever, that:
We do not wish to be understood as intimating in any way that the
Auten rule could or could not be applied profitably to some corporate ques-
tions. Nor do we pass judgment upon the relative merits of the 'internal
affairs' doctrine, vis-a-vis the Auten rule except to note our disagreement
with appellants' suggestion that the 'internal affairs' doctrine has no applica-
tion to the branch of the law with which we are dealing, or that it clearly
serves no useful purpose at all. We think it is generally agreed that, in fact,
'the values of predictability and ease of application are best served by this
rule.'81
The appellants then proceeded to their ultimate argument that even
if the New York courts do adhere to the general internal affairs doc-
trine which refers such matters to the law of the state of incorpora-
tion, that the public policy of New York is such that it should not
tolerate the application of Venezuelan law in this instance. "The crux
of this argument is that New York courts, which allow minority stock-
holder actions, would not defer to the policy of Venezuela (the
corporation's domicile), which, in effect, allows only majority stock-
holder actions."82  The court rejected this contention, after a short
wallow in the uncertainty concerning what New York public policy
actually is. The court apparently was not persuaded that the al-
lowance of minority stockholder actions is an important and basic
matter of New York policy, and nothing appeared to have been cited
78. Id. at 703.
79. 308 N.Y. 155, 124 N.E.2d 99 (1954).
80. 172 N.E.2d 526, 211 N.Y.S.2d 133 (1961).
81. 299 F.2d 696, 704 (2d Cir. 1962).
82. Id. at 705.
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by plaintiffs to that effect. The court pointed out that there is logic
behind the Venezuelan position that only a majority of the share-
holders could bring such a suit-nuisance value suits and the cavalier
institution of unfounded litigation are avoided. Judge Kaufman stated
that there is nothing heinous or reprehensible in the Venezuelan po-
sition and that "we are not persuaded that the Venezuelan law under
consideration is 'immoral" or 'fundamentally unjust' or that it con-
travenes any New York policy involving the right of stockholders to
participate in the management of a corporation through the interven-
tion of the courts."8 The opinion also noted that New York would
probably enforce the so-called "Massachusetts rule" which effectively
bars a derivative action unless it is approved by an independent ma-
jority of shareholders. The court pointed out that one should not
argue "too strongly upon public policy;-it is a very unruly horse,
and when once you get astride it you never know where it will
carry you .... 84
The court, in effect, said that it cannot discover any public policy
of New York on these points. Even if it could have deduced a policy
from the existence of highly important procedural devices granted
to minority shareholders, Venezuela's variation from the New York
format is not so heinous that it violates fundamental principles of jus-
tice or "outrages the public policy of New York." If, however, New
York statutes-or possibly even the New York courts-had expressed
themselves forcefully to the effect that there was a relevant New York
public policy, then this type of opinion indicates that a different
ultimate decision might result. It is also interesting to note that the
opinion does not state the nature of the connection between New
York and the business and affairs of the Venezuelan corporation, ex-
cept to say that it was not a "paper" corporation. If the issue in the
case were not the ability to bring a minority stockholder's derivative
action but rather the ability to declare a dividend or to take some
other action which contravenes the provisions of Chapter 13 of the
New York Business Corporation Law, the court of appeals would
probably have enforced the New York statutory rule, even though
this would have amounted to an intrusion into the internal affairs
of the Venezuelan corporation. The expression of public policy by
the New York Legislature concerning the matters enumerated in
Chapter 13 would presumably result in the enforcement of these
specific sections; the failure of the New York legislature to include
any other specific actions of a foreign corporation to be governed
by New York law could probably be taken as an expression of legis-
83. Id.
84. Id. at 706.
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lative intention to exclude all matters not set forth therein from the
operation of New York public policy. However, it is interesting to
note that the case made no reference to Chapter 13 of the New York
Business Corporation Act of 1961, or to any inferences that might
be drawn from its provisions. The court treated the choice of law
matter as a strict common law question, without statutory directions
or pressures.
The Hausan case illustrates many aspects of conflict of laws theory
which impinge upon foreign corporation problems and the special
characteristics and difficulties which must be met in the solution of
such problems. In general most courts approach cases involving the
internal affairs of foreign corporations in the same terms and with
the same rigidity which was found in Beale's closed universe of con-
flict of laws of fifty years ago. A very respectable proportion of
modern courts, in most matters before them, would be receptive to
the proposition of the local law theorists that their actions constituted
enforcement of the local law of the forum, with due attention paid
to the manner in which a related foreign state would decide the same
question. However, most court decisions in foreign corporation matters
are still expressed in terms resembling the vested rights concepts of
enforcing foreign law.85 Because the foreign corporation derives its
existence from the act of another sovereign, American courts have
generally regarded it as solely the creature of, and wholly dependent
upon, the foreign state, which is not to be tampered with by the local
law of the host state. With few exceptions, American courts tend to
regard foreign corporation problems as generically different from
ordinary conflict problems and largely immune from treatment by
the approach of local law theorists. The umbilical tie of the foreign
corporation to the state of its charter is usually still religiously re-
garded as conclusive in determining the law to be applied in intra-
corporate disputes. The fundamental re-examination of the nature of
conflict of laws over the past few years has virtually left foreign
corporation matters remaining as a pocket of the past in a subject
area which has otherwise been characterized by free inquiry, change
and flux.
In the relatively few instances in which foreign corporation matters
have been considered in recent writings, they are usually discussed
either from the point of view of the genuine foreign corporation (with
85. Lorenzen points out cogently that the fixity of vested rights concepts has been
responsible for creating rules "which govern 'on principle,' to be set aside under certain
circumstances by the rules of 'public policy' or 'public order.' Anglo-American courts
and writers . . . also use language implying that the ordinary rules, governing 'on
principle,' are the expression of the territoriality of law . . . ." Lorenzen, Territorialty,
Public Policy and the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 736, 746 (1924).
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respect to whose internal affairs local law should have little reason
for application) or, at the other extreme, from the vantage point of
the extreme pseudo-foreign corporation (with no connection to any
state other than the host state, except for the issuance of the charter).
The shading in the spectrum between these two extremes is seldom
mentioned or analyzed. This polarizing generally proceeds either on
the theory of applying the law of the state of incorporation as a manda-
tory matter because of the nature of things or, in the case of the
pseudo-foreign corporation, on a theory analogous to the concept of
fraud on the law, though that term is disavowed. The flexible and
penetrating analysis of the local law theorists from Cook to Cavers
to Currie, 6 with the breakdown of broad subjects into specific issues
and narrow rules and with the subjects analyzed and vivisected on
the basis of the interests of the parties and of the states involved,
has no counterpart in the field of foreign corporations.
It may be that the first few wispy stirrings of this type of local
law analysis are now becoming detectable. The primary commentaries
upon foreign corporations in the past two or three decades have been
the articles by Dean Latty of Duke University entitled Pseudo-For-
eign Corporations,87 and by Professors Reese and Kaufman entitled
The Law Governing Corporate Affairs: Choice of Law and the Impact
of Full Faith and Credit.8 The article by Professors Reese and Kauf-
man is a comprehensive discussion of a wide range of corporation
problems in the conflict of laws growing out of a consideration of
the lower court opinion in the Western Airlines case, which was
subsequently reversed. The authors disapprove of the position which
was finally taken by the upper court in the Western Airlines litiga-
tion. Its general thesis matches that of Restatement (Second),89 of
which Professor Reese was reporter. Restatement (Second) retains
the blanket rule on foreign corporations that the law of the state of
incorporation shall govern but expresses it in terms which make it
less of a commandment than a statement of expediency. This mode
of presentation, at least, opens the matter to argument and discussion.
Moreover, the statement of the broad rule is furnished with a caveat
that no position is taken on the law applicable to a pseudo-foreign
corporation, thus opening the question of possible deviation from the
application of the law of the forum at least in this one situation-
and also leaving open the definition of pseudo-foreign corporation.
86. CAvERs, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PRocESs (1965); CUREi, SELECTED ESSAYS ON"
Cormcr OF LAws (1963); Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of Conflicts of
Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457 (1924).
87. 65 YALE L.J. 137 (1955).
88. 58 COLUm. L. REv. 1118 (1958).




In his article, Dean Latty argues strongly that pseudo-foreign cor-
porations should be governed by the laws of the states in which
they operate and realistically have their being, rather than by the
laws of the states which merely granted them charters. His views to
this end were embodied in the draft of the corporation act for the
State of North Carolina, although the provisions were deleted from
the statute as finally enacted.
An exceedingly able and searching consideration of the liability
of shareholders in a foreign business trust, in the framework of a
local law analysis against a background of comparison with foreign
corporations, is contained in a long student note; in attempting to
apply Professor Currie's governmental interest theory to the questions
presented, the author states:
Where it is suggested that a foreign law be applied, a court should de-
termine the nature of the policy underlying the forum law. If the relation
of the forum to the case provides a legitimate basis for asserting an interest
in applying its own policy, then the rule of decision under forum law
should prevail, regardless of any interest of a foreign state.90
Although there may appear to be greater freedom to apply the local
law approach to a foreign business trust, as contrasted with a foreign
corporation, because of the formal differences between the two
entities, the note itself recognizes that the two types of entities per-
form very much the same function and have similar roles. The
use of the local law approach and the examination of the interests
and the public policy of the states involved inevitably suggest that
a similar approach may not be inappropriate for foreign business
trusts and foreign corporations.
The possibility of the application of the law of the forum is also
hinted at in the Hausman case where Judge Kaufman weighed the
contention that foreign corporation matters should be considered in
the light of the local law analysis, which might conceivably call for
the application of the local law of the host state. This approach was
rejected with the disclaimer that a federal court should not attempt
to make new law under circumstances where it is required to observe
and follow the law of the state in which the federal court sits.
The possible application of modern conflict of law approaches to
foreign corporations is also considered ably and at length in The For-
eign Corporation-A Problem in Choice-of-Law Doctrine by Donald
L. Block Baraf. 91 This article is primarily directed at the status and
development of New York statutory provisions concerning foreign
90. Note, Limited Liability of Shareholders in Real Estate Investment Trusts and
the Conflict of Laws, 50 CAIw. L. REv. 696 (1962).
91. 33 BRooxaN L. REv. 219 (1967).
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corporations, against a background consideration of the constitution-
ality of the exercise of regulatory power over foreign corporations
by a host state. After expressing admiration for the method of
analysis proposed and exemplified by Professor Currie,92 Mr. Baraf
states:
Consequently, the possibility of real conflict and uncertainty arising out
of the absence of a constitutionally required uniformity is indeed a real
problem.... The groping for a unifying principle thus must move beyond
merely railing against the logical inconsistency of multi-state regulation of
a unitary transaction or emphasizing the need for judicial subordination to
the often irrelevant dictates of the domicile (because commentators throw
up their hands and exclaim that some uniform rule is better than none and
that the domicile is the most readily identifiable contact point).
Instead of emphasizing the virtue of certainty and thus promoting a
rule of automatic reference, a rule which stresses the need for protection
might be developed. Such a rule would provide that whenever the law of
the domicile conflicts with the law of the state in which the corporation
is doing business that law which best serves to protect the interest of
creditors and/or shareholders would be applicable. This would be con-
sistent with the modem view favoring protection and would impose upon
corporations a more rigid adherence to evolving standards of increased
fiduciary obligation. 93
Such scanty academic and judicial feelers toward the distant
chance of turning away from the rigid rule of the law of the state
of incorporation may indicate a possible route for governing foreign
corporations by the law of the state where their activities are primarily
conducted, rather than by the law arbitrarily chosen by the entre-
preneurs who created the entity. Unless the host state, whose law
is asserted, has a significant interest in the matter in litigation and
a policy of protecting that interest, the law of the state of incorpora-
tion might as well govern, and the law of the host state should not
properly apply. In a situation where both the chartering state and
the host state have interests to protect, then, unless the host state has
some strong corporation policy, the collision of interests between
two states without an opposition of significant policy will not justify
the application of the law of the host state. That would probably
constitute a type of conflict which is both unimportant and "false,"
in the terminology of Professor Currie and Judge Traynor. 4 This sug-
gests that it would be profitable to inquire into the existence of
public policy-that region where Judge Kaufman searched in vain for
92. Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law: Governmental Interests and
the Judicial Function, 26 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 9 (1958); Currie, The Verdict of Quiescent
Years, Mr. Hill and the Conflict of Laws, 28 U. C i. L. REv. 258 (1961). For a brief
summary of Curries methodology, see CHEATnAm, ET AL. supra note 22 at 477-78.
93. Supra note 91, at 252.
94. Traynor, Is This Conflict Really Necessary?, 37 TEXAs L. Rev. 657 (1959).
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a New York policy on which to support the contention of the plaintiff
in Hausman v. Buckley.
It must be admitted that the evoking of public policy as a basis
for decision usually introduces uncertainty into the law and brings
litigants into a difficult and amorphous area. Many American com-
mentators have suggested that the employment of public policy, to
be avoided wherever possible, is, in effect, abandoning logical analysis
for parochial emotionalism.95 Public policy is undoubtedly an "un-
ruly horse," to be utilized only with care and a proper understanding
of its role. However, the public policy concept can, as Ehrenzweig
has suggested,9 furnish protection against a rigid and over-generalized
rule of conflict of laws which needs to be made more flexible and
trimmed to more appropriate size. It is a talismanic phrase which
is palatable to many courts and may be helpful for a re-examina-
tion of a rigid rule, holding over from the days of vested rights and
strict territoriality; without it, the court would have to reconsider
the whole philosophic question of the way corporations should be
governed and study in depth the decisions in the field of conflict of
laws in other areas. Exceptions to a rigid rule, even in the name of
public policy, might be useful in eventually leading to such a broader
reconsideration. If properly and narrowly defined some public policy
exceptions might provide a set of rules narrow and predictable enough
to afford reasonable certainty with respect to the few situations in
which the host state might properly safeguard its interests and apply
local law to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation.
In an excellent article, Suggested Limitations of Public Policy
Doctrine,9 Charles Nutting considers the provision of the first Restate-
ment (which has been continued in the same form in the Restatement
(Second)) to the effect that "no action can be maintained upon a
cause of action created in another state, the enforcement of which
is contrary to the strong public policy of the forum." "Immediately,"
Professor Nutting says, "numerous questions come to mind. Is this
actually a statement of existing law? What is public policy? How
does a strong public policy differ from any other kind? Is is desirable
that the application of the rule be strictly limited? If so, how is it to
be done And, perhaps the fundamental query, should we have a
rule of this kind at all?"8
Professor Nutting considers Professor Cavers' suggestion "that the
invocation of public policy may constitute a device for the prevention
95. See note 75 supra.
96. Em NZwm, PhVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW 154 (1967).
97. 19 Mnr. L. REv. 196 (1935).
98. Id. at 197.
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of a too rigid adherence to the law generally deemed applicable to a
given case."99 He concludes that public policy is necessarily too
nebulous a concept to be employed without specific rules and asserts
that "although there is a place for the public policy doctrine in safe-
guarding the domestic interests of the state from foreign encroach-
ment, the declaration of policy is a matter which should be entrusted
to the legislature rather than the courts."100
This course of having the state's public policy with respect to
foreign corporations declared by the legislature has been followed
by New York, which has specified precisely which sections of the
New York Business Corporation Act shall apply to foreign corpori-
tions. Presumably the specification of certain applicable provisions
carries with it the corollary that other portions of the statute are not
applicable to foreign corporations.
A different type of statutory determination of public policy is con-
tained in the California statute involved in the Western Airlines case,
where broad general language, referring to all sales within the state,
is interpreted as applying to all sales of securities by any corporation,
domestic and foreign.
The recent case of Gaillard v. Field,'"' involving the question of
whether investments in oil interests were securities, illustrates the
uncertainties of ascertaining public policy in a subject area closely
related to corporation matters. The plaintiffs were California resi-
dents, who sought to rescind the purchases on the ground of non-
compliance with California securities laws; suit was brought in Okla-
homa where the blue-sky law did not treat oil interests as securities.
The place where the sale was made and the contract entered into is
quite vague in the opinion. In rejecting the plaintiffs' claim the court,
in a vague, unexplicit and unsatisfactory opinion, stated:
The policy of Oklahoma is not passive, neutral, or unarticulated. The con-
trariety with California law is expressed in clear statutory language. Ap-
pellants argue that the difference between the California and the Oklahoma
statutes is an unimportant detail because the basic policy of each state is
the regulation of securities. Regulation of securities is undoubtedly the
basic policy of the Oklahoma Securities Act, but oil and gas transactions
are not securities in Oklahoma.'
0 2
The court stated further, in commenting upon the application of the
full faith and credit clause, that the cases cited "considered together
establish that the legitimate interest of the forum state may out-
99. Id. at 198.
100. Id. at 209.
101. 381 F.2d 25 (10th Cir. 1967).
102. Id. at 27-28.
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weigh the unifying principle embodied in the full faith and credit
clause."10 3 In reaching its conclusion that to apply California law
"would violate a deep-rooted tradition of the common weal in Okla-
homa,"'4 the court did not take judicial notice of the public policy
and received no evidence on the point other than the testimony of a
former chairman of the Oklahoma Securities Commission.' The
testimony in the record showed only that the Oklahoma version of
the Uniform Securities Act as originally adopted contained a provision
which clearly included oil and gas interests as securities, and that,
after several years, the Act was amended to exempt such interests.
The testimony of the "expert" did not mention the phrase public
policy or the tradition of the state, and the strong language used by
the court seems to have been drawn from its own interpretation of the
peculiar status and significance of the oil and gas industry in Okla-
homa. Or perhaps the court interpreted the special attention paid
by the legislature in exempting oil interests by later amendment as
constituting an expression of strong policy.106 Perhaps, even this court
is following an atavistic remnant of the discarded position that a for-
eign mode of procedure is against public policy merely because it is
different.
The provision for equal treatment of foreign corporations, and a
limitation clause prohibiting intrusion into the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation, generally found in corporation acts, could con-
ceivably constitute a declaration of the state's public policy and be
dispositive of the question of the law applicable to foreign corpora-
tions. Such provisions, though literally relevant, are probably only
tangentially and unintentionally related to the problem of the law
applicable to foreign corporations. These two types of clauses were
considered in the McCormick case, which discussed sections 102 and
103 of the Illinois Business Corporation Act.' 7 The equal treatment
clause is found in the statutes of twenty-nine states and the no-
intrusion clause in the statutes of nineteen of those twenty-nine states.
There have been relatively few attempts to explore the meaning of
103. Id. at 28.
104. Id. at 29.
105. The court refused to permit the introduction in evidence of a study by the
"legislative counsel" of Oklahoma recommending the amendment of the securities law
to exempt oil and gas interests. Record at 85.
106. The related question of whether the sale of securities issued by a corporation of
one state can be held void under the securities law of another state raises an interesting
question of extraterritoriality. The securities act of a state can undoubtedly determine
the legality of the sale of securities of a foreign corporation made within the state.
Whether the blue-sky law can invalidate a securities issue by a foreign corporation is
dubious. See Mau v. Montana, Pac. Oil Co., 16 Del. Ch. 114, 120-22, 141 A. 828,
831-32 (1928); L. Loss & E. M. Cow=rr, BLuE-SKy LAws 192 (1958).
107. See supra note 67 and connected text.
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either of these two sections. The inclusion of a clause, which grants
equal treatment to a foreign corporation but requires it to bear the
same burdens and responsibilities as a domestic corporation, could
arguably be the basis for broad application of domestic rules of con-
duct to the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. It is highly
doubtful that the inclusion of such a provision really means that the
state is thereby announcing either a mandate or a permission to apply
domestic law generally to foreign corporations. In a few instances
such a clause has been so interpreted, particularly when the clause
is contained in the state's constitution as well as its corporation act.108
It is probable that such a clause was intended to mean that foreign
corporations, in relationships with third persons, should.be in the same
situation as domestic corporations, rather than that the internal affairs
of a foreign corporation are to be governed by domestic law. It would
seem strained and unjustified to regard this provision as a pronounce-
ment that domestic law should govern internal affairs of a foreign
corporation. 10 9
A clause forbidding intrusion into the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation could, however, easily be interpreted to be an expression
of policy to the effect that the state should not apply its laws to gov-
ern a foreign corporation's internal affairs; the language of such a
provision seems literally so to provide. Since automatic reference to
the state of incorporation is so traditional a means of determining the
appropriate law for governance of the internal affairs of a foreign
corporation, it is possible that such a clause would be so interpreted.
It is probable, however, that the clause was merely designed to have
the state refrain from exercising jurisdiction over suits involving the
internal affairs of a foreign corporation. It could be cogently argued
that if the state's policy is against permitting such a dispute to be
tried in its courts, then the legislative intention would, a fortiori,
refer all matters relating to internal affairs to the law of the chartering
state for determination. However, the history and intention of such
a no-intrusion provision would suggest that it should be interpreted
as a pronouncement that the state regarded itself as an improper
forum for litigation, rather than being a statement of policy with re-
108. Williams v. Gold Hill Mining Co., 96 F. 454 (N.D. Cal. 1899).
109. In his discussion of "equal treatment" statutes, Latty comments that: "Some of
these provisions would, if taken literally, automatically subject all foreign-chartered
corporations to local corporation law; others would similarly apply if liberally construed;
nearly all would so apply if the court strained the interpretation a bit, as courts will.
from time to time .... Yet it is quite conceivable that under such statutes local
corporation law would, on many occasions where the courts are faced with protection
of local interests, be applied to pseudo-foreign corporations." Latty, Pseudo-Foreign
Corporations, 65 YALE L.J. 137, 157 (1955). See also Coleman, Corporate Dividends
and the Conflict of Laws, 63 HAnv. L. Bxv. 433, 444 (1950).
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spect to the appropriate law to be applied to the internal affairs of a
foreign corporation." 0 It should be noted, however, that, after the
enactment of such provisions, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
has, in most states, practically superseded the earlier doctrine that
only the state of incorporation should try matters relating to the
internal affairs of its corporations. At the present time, states which
have enacted no-intrusion clauses exhibit little hesitancy in accepting
a case for trial even though the internal affairs of a foreign corpora-
tion are involved.
The determination of what portions, if any, of such a long and com-
plex statute as the corporation act shall be considered as expressing
public policy is very difficult. The inferences which one must draw
from scant and wispy evidences of public policy are generally tenuous
and unsatisfactory. Legislative history in this field is generally sparse
and inadequate and provides little enlightenment. If the particular
provision of the corporation act is included mandatorily by direction of
the state's constitution, it is probable that such a provision should be
treated as enunciating a strong public policy. Similarly, if a statute
is amended to include a provision granting a particular remedy
which was not theretofore available, the fact that the matter was
regarded as important enough for individual amendment might sug-
gest that it involves public policy. On the other hand, it may very
well be that such an amendment is merely another aspect of the rule
of the road which was subsequently inserted, as a simple house-
keeping measure, to clarify procedures and avoid disputes. Pro-
fessor Rabel,"' in his comparative study of the conflict of laws, de-
110. A portion of § 99, 1[ 1, of the Model Business Corporation Act contains a "no-
intrusion" clause which corresponds to § 102 of the Illinois Act. The comment to §
99, ff 1, indicating that the purpose of such a clause is not to prescribe the answer to
a choice of law question, reads in part as follows: "Section 99 of the Model Act does
not confer any power on the officials, agencies or courts of a state to regulate the
organization or the internal affairs of a foreign corporation. Conversely, this section
does not attempt to preclude the exercise of any power the state may otherwise have
to regulate by other statutes those activities of a foreign corporation which might
ordinarily be construed as involving issues of organization or internal affairs nor does
it deny the power to the courts of the state to apply common law principles affecting
the organization or internal affairs of a foreign corporation. This section of the Model
Act neither grants nor limits any power of a state over the internal affairs of foreign
corporations." [Emphasis added]. 2 ABA-ALI Model Bus. Corp. Act Ann. comment
on § 99, I[ 1 (1960). Such "hands-off" or no-intrusion statutes, says Latty, "by no
means foreclose the question of applicability of local law to foreign-chartered corpora-
tions, for the courts can and often do say, when faced with a pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion: this is not really a foreign corporation at all; its foreignness is a fiction, not
substance .... such provisions seemingly putting foreign corporations beyond local law
should really be no more the determinative factor than those numerous statutes previ-
ously discussed purporting to put foreign corporations under the local corporation law."
Latty, supra note 109, at 159.
111. See STaomn, supra note 75, at 209.
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votes an interesting chapter to the subject of public policy. He notes
the American repugnance to the use of the public policy concept
and considers the desirability of restricting the use of public policy
to situations where legislative pronouncements announce public policy,
following Nutting's thesis."12 Rabel, however, suggests that statutes
contain two types of provisions, one designed for regulation of
private affairs and the other designed to protect the public order.
The public aspects of such a statute express public policy; the private
aspects, Rabel suggests, are merely rule-of-the-road mechanical pro-
cedures, with respect to which public policy is neutral. However,
Rabel suggests no workable touchstone for separating the private
aspect from the public one and leaves unresolved the problem of
how to determine which portion of the statute sets forth public policy
and which is purely mechanical. Any attempt to determine which part
of a corporation statute expresses a significant public policy and which
part is merely mechanical and neutral would involve a difficult and
wayward search.
If the corporation statute is of the enabling kind and generally grants
the entrepreneurs a relatively free hand in working out such arrange-
ments as they may specify in their organic documents, could it be
argued that this implies a broad public policy, on issues not specifically
covered, favoring management? If, on the other hand, the statute pro-
vides pervasive and stringent controls over corporate actions and con-
tains a detailed, comprehensive and restrictive series of specifications
for corporate conduct, could the reverse policy be inferred; could a
court deduce a broad public policy restrictive with respect to manage-
ment and in favor of protecting minority shareholders? Although there
might be much cogency behind such inferences, the public policy so
deduced is too amorphous, diffuse and uncertain, and should not be
used as a basis for governing the internal procedures of a foreign
corporation, without some specific statutory directive or some special
indication of ethical compulsion behind a given section of the cor-
poration statute of the forum." 3 Variations and differences in formats,
procedures, and specificity, in themselves, have no public policy con-
tent, but merely indicate differences in the statutory techniques of
setting forth the rules of the road. If a corporation statute, such as
that of Illinois, is generally of the enabling character but has a few
112. Supra note 97.
113. For an example of the problems of ascertaining the public policy underlying
Ontario's host-guest liability statute and the difficulties of measuring its temperature,
intensity, continued importance and the sources from which answers to these inquiries
can be obtained, see Trautman, A Comment on Kell v. Anderson, 67 CoLum. L. REV.
465 (1967). For a contrary interpretation of the public policy indicators see the
remarks of Professor Moffat Hancock as reported, and commented upon by Professor
Keeffe in 54 A.B.A.J. 91 (1968).
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regulatory provisions-such as mandatory cumulative voting and the
prohibition of non-voting stock-can it be said that the public policy is
genuinely expressed in, at least, these few dissimilar provisions? Could
it be contended that public policy is expressed by provisions of a
corporation act which (a) are included by constitutional requirement,
or (b) are unusual or innovative (at least at their inception), or (c)
impose sanctions by criminal or civil penalties (other than mere
restitution), or (d) are couched in rhetoric of ethical imperatives,
of a character usually associated with matters of public policy?
Professor Latty suggests on this point:
One good touchstone of the strength of the legislative policy expressed
in a particular protective feature is whether a domestic corporation could
legally circumvent the feature-for instance, by an appropriate clause in its
charter or by-laws. That is, if the same ends as this pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion is reaching could be attained by a domestic corporation with a prop-
erly drafted charter or by-laws, there is not much point in insisting on
application of local law to the foreign enterprise. Similarly, if the local
corporation statutes themselves offer ready methods for circumventing other
protective features of local corporation law, there would seem to be little
point in applying those protective features even to a pseudo-foreign corpora-
tion.1 1 4
Although this suggestion, that public policy be equated with the
non-evasory character of a statutory provision, has great plausibility,
it would, in practical effect, probably eliminate almost all public policy
considerations. There are in fact few protective features of any cor-
poration statutes which cannot be effectively circumvented. The
Illinois statutory provisions for mandatory cumulative voting and pro-
hibition of non-voting stock-buttressed by constitutional mandate
and by documented constitutional history indicating a strong public
policy-present probably as vigorous a pronouncement of state public
policy behind corporate requirements as can be found anywhere in
the United States. This policy has shown sufficient vigor to be pro-
tected against partial circumvention by denying board members the
right to fill vacancies on the board of directors and by prohibiting
staggered boards. However, the requirement is effectively under-
mined in daily practice by issuing several classes of stock at different
prices each with one vote per share (e.g., 1000 Class A common shares
sold for $100 each and 1500 Class B common shares sold for $1 each).
Does the ability effectively to shift control about freely and to circum-
vent the underlying purposes of these requirements of the Illinois
statute mean that there is no public policy content behind them?
Such a conclusion is, of course, untenable. Perhaps the better way
114. Latty, supra note 109, at 160.
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of determining the existence of a public policy would be to follow
Professor Latty's other suggestion that:
Perhaps a guide to the strength of the policy behind a particular pro-
tective feature would be the seriousness or prevalence of the actual evils,
and to a lesser degree the potential evils, against which it is aimed. Testing
it by this standard we should say, for example, that the Nebraska fair-and-
just statute for recapitalizations represents a strong policy choice. So does
the mandatory dividend provision of the new. .. North Carolina Business
Corporation Act, which permits sizable shareholders under certain circum-
stances to force dividend payments of one-third of annual net profits. Even
without a knowledge of the legislative history of such a provision we can
see clearly that it purports to cope with a serious minority stockholder prob-
lem which arises frequently in close corporations-such corporations being
the prevailing pattern in North Carolina.
115
The task of ascertaining the existence of a public policy directive
behind a particular provision of the corporation statute is tortuous,
difficult and uncertain in the absence of an explicit statutory directive
by the legislature. And even if a domestic public policy is discernible,
there is usually only vague uncertainty as to the applicability of such
policy to foreign entities. Where, however, such a statutory directive
specifying applicable provisions of local statutes exists, as in New
York, the course is clear. Where there is no statutory directive, the
use of the public policy argument to justify the application of the
law of the host state to a foreign corporation calls for great circum-
spection and restraint on the part of the courts. Its application may
depend upon the clarity of the public policy doctrine in the state and
its importance and intensity and also upon the character of the cor-
poration. If the corporation is a pseudo-foreign corporation, then
it would seem that the court of the host state might apply its local
law fairly freely, as a common law choice-of-law matter, if it could
be made to appear that local public policy was of significant force.
Where the corporation involved is a quasi-foreign corporation, the
courts' freedom to apply local law should be restrained and determined
in direct relation to the extent to which the corporation has sub-
stantial contacts and affiliations with states other than the host state.
In the case of the genuine foreign corporation and the national cor-
poration, the host state should refrain from applying its local law to
the internal affairs of such entities in the absence of an express statu-
tory directive. These conclusions are not based upon lack of power
in the host state or on any constitutional obstacle. Rather, they are
based upon the desirability of avoiding the difficulty of ascertaining





The primary argument against the application of local law to a
foreign corporation, even when constitutionality is admitted, is that
a dual or variable set of rules would introduce unbearable chaos and
uncertainty into the law. The precise details of such confusion are
seldom stated, other than to assert that it would be impossible to
comply with mutually exclusive requirements. Such a result would
almost never occur under present corporation statutes and is unlikely
to occur in the future. This argument of uncertainty and confusion
is seldom challenged, though it is probably neither so cogent nor so
compelling as it might at first seem.
116
The comparable potentialities of double taxation, divisible divorce,
and other variable rules of law throughout the realm of conflict of
laws have not caused irremediable chaos, or intolerable disruption,
nor have they forced inexorable unity of rule. The European con-
cept of commercial domicile for corporations, which could theoretically
lead to duality or conflict between the law of the country of incorpora-
tion and the country where the commercial seat is located, does not
seem to have disrupted corporate operations or forced abandonment
of the commercial domicile concept. Railroads which are incorporated
or domesticated under the corporation acts of several states have
managed to work out their problems, despite multiple applicable
standards.117 The contention of the Restatement and of other com-
mentators that avoidance of confusion and difficulty makes it im-
perative to look to the law of the state of incorporation seems belied
by the experience of New York. For many decades New York has
required all foreign corporations to conduct themselves in accord with
domestic rules with respect to dividends, certain directors' duties, and
certain other specified provisions of the domestic corporation statute.
So far as any published difficulty is concerned, it seems to have been
minimal. In any event, the catastrophic results of dual corporate
regulation which might otherwise be predicted do not seem to have
occurred. Such regulation appears to have been viable for foreign cor-
porations. Furthermore, there are extensive and sometimes conflicting
dual controls, state and federal, at the present time in many corporate
matters-primarily in the area of corporate internal affairs. In the last
few years there has been an extraordinarily rapid burgeoning of so-
called "federal common law of corporations," based upon implied civil
116. Wolfson v. Avery, 6 II. 2d 78, 126 N.E.2d 701 (1955); People ex rel Weber
v. Cohn, 339 Ill. 121, 171 N.E. 159 (1930).
117. For a discussion of a similar assertion about the possible conflict of antithetical
commands under different blue-sky laws, see Sobieski, State Blue Sky Jurisdiction over
Foreign Corporations, 14 HAsnNGs L. REv. 75, 90 (1962).
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liability under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934;
this law is pervading, and all but absorbing, a large portion of internal
fiduciary obligations." 8 There is a substantial and growing body of
federal corporation law under Sections 14 and 16 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, governing insider trading and proxy regula-
tions. The reorganization doctrines under Chapter XI of the National
Bankruptcy Act follow a strict priority doctrine in sharp contrast with
the increasingly lax standards applicable in recapitalizations, mergers
and readjustments."' 9 Although the existence of these duplicating and
complementary controls, state and federal, has created a situation of
theoretical conflict, the practical results have been accepted and via-
ble, and the duplication of controls has resulted not so much in con-
flict as in cumulative standards.120 Consternation over the problems
of dual standards has not deterred the development of a significant
body of federal corporation law;'2 ' likewise, such a possibility should
not preclude a host state from the development of appropriate re-
quirements to govern those foreign corporations with which it has
significant and important contacts and an important public policy to
assert and vindicate.m
118. The decisions seem to order that such corporations shall not act in violation of
the positive prohibitions of any state in which the entity is incorporated. See generally
Foley, Incorporation, Multiple Incorporation, and the Conflict of Laws, 42 HAEv. L.
REv. 516 (1929).
119. Daum & Phillips, The Implications of Cady, Roberts, 17 Bus. LAW. 939 (1962);
Fleischer, Federal Corporation Law: An Assessment, 78 HAzv. L. REV. 1146 (1965);
Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv.
383, 413 (1964); Ruder, Pitfalls in the Development of a Federal Law of Corporations
by Implication through Rule 10b-5, 59 Nw. U.L. REv. 185 (1964).
120. Comment, A Standard of Fairness for Compensating Preferred Shareholders in
Corporate Reorganizations, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 97 (1965).
121. For representative cases in which the federal law superseded the state law in
matters traditionally within the area of concern of state law, see, e.g., J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964) (validity of proxy and invalidity of merger); McClure
v. Borne Chem. Co., 292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961) (security for costs); Miller v.
Steinbach, 268 F. Supp. 255 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (appraisal rights and effect of dissolution
of corporation on surviving rights).
122. If conflicting regulation of the internal affairs of foreign corporations were ever
to result in a non-viable situation of confusion, then it is not improbable that the
Supreme Court might turn to the due process clause or to the full faith and credit
clause to enforce uniformity. The doctrine of the Wolfe case might then be applied
to the internal affairs of corporations. In this connection it is appropriate to note the
second caveat to § 166a of the RFSTATEMENT (SEcoND) oF CONFLICT OF LAWS (Tent.
Draft No. 7, 1963). "The Institute likewise expresses no opinion whether there are
situations where, as between States of the United States, the Constitution requires
application of the local law of the State of incorporation to determine questions in-
volving the organic structure or internal administration of a corporation. Otherwise,
situations may arise where one State can prevent a corporation from taking action
affecting its organic structure or internal administration which the corporation could
lawfully take under the local law of its State of incorporation and also perhaps under
the local law of the great majority of States in which the corporation does business."
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Although states have the power to apply their domestic laws to
foreign corporations, the fact is that they lack the inclination to do
so. This reluctance is not due to a matter of jurisdiction but rather
to a decline in interest in providing protection for investors through
corporation statutes. The clamorous criticism of the 1920"s and 1930's,
directed against the competitive leniency of Delaware laws, is seldom
heard today and has largely been replaced by acquiescence, indif-
ference and resigned emulation. In an era of mergers and combina-
tions, there is an increasing tendency to make the process of merger
quicker and simpler, to broaden the types of securities which can be
forced upon dissenters, and to diminish or abandon dissenters' rights.
The notion that the real remedy of the dissenting stockholder is to
sell his security in the open market for what he can get and move on
to another investment seems to be gaining headway. It has eminent
academic acceptance, 23 it has been the general policy of major insti-
tutional investors and has recently been embodied in the Delaware
Corporation Act, by amendments effective July 1, 1968.124 In general,
it can be said that the position of management in corporate enterprise
is largely becoming more secure, that the powers accorded to manage-
ment are in practice becoming greater and that the status of indi-
vidual shareholders is becoming less secure. 2 5 No new state legis-
lative machinery is being provided to fill gaps in protection of the
interests of the shareholders against managerial excess or to replace
earlier mechanisms which have been rendered ineffective by the phe-
nomenon of shareholder dispersion and the size of enterprise. It may
be that these developments are necessary concomitants of the nature
of the modem corporation and of the modem securities 'market. How-
ever, it seems that the effort to work out suitable protective and
regulatory devices at the state level is being abandoned with undue
haste. The trend makes one doubt whether there is much public policy
force behind the provisions of state corporation laws and leads to the
expectation that even the rare instances where strong public policy
underlies state corporation acts will continue to decrease.
Possibly the complacency about corporation laws and the relative
inactivity of the states, in matters of investor protection through cor-
poration acts, may in some measure be attributable to the dramatic
growth of federal intervention and inventiveness in this area. There
is a great public interest in matters of investor protection. News-
123. Manning, The Shareholders" Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for Frank Coker,
72 YALE L.J. 223 (1962).
124. Arsht & Stapleton, Delaware's New General Corporation Law: Substantial
Changes, 23 Bus. IAw. 75, 87 (1967).
125. See Gibson, How Fixed are Class Shareholder Rights? 23 LAw & CONTEII'.
PO.o. 282 (1958).
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papers carry a great many articles about alleged corporate misdeeds,
and federal court dockets contain many cases alleging corporate
wrongs; however, the remedial action is largely sought by the SEC
or in suits under statutes administered by the SEC. Here, as in many
other areas of government, the states have drawn back and left a
large part of the field to federal activity and control.
If the states wish to regain their prior position in the field of
investor protection, it will necessitate a change in the legislative atti-
tude and a reversal of the trend of corporation statutes, from the
enabling to the regulatory type. The argument that the states cannot
do this because of the competitive availability of Delaware's lenient
laws could be met-if the will to do so existed-by statutory directives
that foreign corporations doing business within the states must com-
ply with specified domestic corporate requirements. The New York
type of statutory device for specifying the provisions of the corpora-
tion act which are applicable to foreign corporations points out the
most satisfactory way to carry out such a process of retaliatory legis-
lation. However, New York itself, in its most recent statutory re-
vision, retained its statutory directive but drained it of much of its
force by reducing the portions of the domestic act applicable to for-
eign corporations and also by exempting a very large proportion of
foreign corporations from the application of its statute.'2 If, how-
ever, several important commercial states chose to use this statutory
directive device for protective purposes and asserted it with vigor,
it might have some effect in reversing the accelerating tendency of all
corporation statutes to become mere enabling acts. If substantial difi-
culty is encountered because of the adoption of strong retaliatory
statutes applying domestic law to foreign corporations, then the pres-
sure to avoid this difficulty could conceivably result either in appro-
126. According to Professor Henn, "One ever-present strand in the thinking of the
Joint Legislative Committee was to 'foster New York incorporation of business and
retention of existing business corporations...."' Henn, The Philosophies of the New
York Business Corporation Act of 1961, 11 BurFr,.o L. REv. 439, 453 (1962). This
objective is "facilitated by a laissez-faire attitude toward corporations: the statute must
be 'enabling' rather than 'regulatory' and should not interfere with their 'internal
affairs.'" Id. Professor Henn then states that the device of express statutory exemption,
which the New York law now contains, is used "to exempt foreign corporations doing
business in New York from New York regulatory policies" in contradistinction to the
rejected provisions of the proposed North Carolina Act, which would have increased
domestic regulations over foreign corporations. Id. at 455 n.109. Similarly, Comment,
Particular Problems under the New York Business Corporation Law, 11 BUFFALo L.
Rlv. 615, 679-81 states: "While the scope of jurisdiction over foreign corporations
has been significantly broadened, the outstanding change in the treatment of foreign
corporations is the narrowing of the class of such corporations which are subject to
extensive internal regulations. . . . It is hoped that the new act will thus secure the
desired results of discouraging domestic investors in businesses from incorporating
elsewhere merely to escape statutory regulation, while not discouraging other foreign
corporations from qualifying and transacting business in New York."
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priate widespread revision of the character of corporation statutes
or in the Supreme Court's intervening and taking federal control, by
application of full faith and credit or due process formulae. Such
pressure might also possibly give impetus to the moribund movement
toward federal incorporation. Political philosophy and individual
predilection would make state action preferable to federal interven-
tion in the area of corporation legislation. The states by clear legis-
lative fiat could effectively assert a public policy in corporate affairs.
However, they must first determine that it is critically important, for
the advancement of the public order, to strengthen and safeguard
the regulatory aspects of corporation statutes and to bolster confidence
in managerial propriety. However, this is not likely to happen. The
governance of corporations is not regarded as significant enough to
cause the states to alter their corporation laws or aims. The will to
take such steps has been found in only one or two states, and even
there it is on the wane. Consequently, the existence of the power
to act is academic. The power appears to exist; the wish to use it
does not.
If it is true that state corporation laws are trending toward virtual
uniformity, then it is probably desirable that such uniformity be pre-
scribed by Congress rather than by emulation of Delaware's Corpora-
tion Act. There is no more reason for the corporation law in the
United States to be set by the standards of Delaware than there is
for the conflicts rules of the world to be promulgated by the Island
of Tobago. The standards of the corporation statutes of the various
states are alleged to have been eroded by the nature of our federal
system. If such is the fact, then the centralizing force of the federal
system should be utilized to provide standards of investor protection
consonant with the needs of the economic system. The federal govern-
ment is playing a very major role in investment protection at the
present time: it prescribes the manner in which new issues of securities
are sold; it regulates securities markets; it lays down proxy rules and
insider trading limitations; it regulates investment advisors and in-
vestment companies; it prescribes the manner in which reorganiza-
tions of corporations in serious financial difficulties shall take place;
it sets standards of disclosure in connection with the purchase or
sales of securities; and it is developing and expanding an important
federal common law of corporations. With such a major involvement
in the sphere of investor protection, it would seem appropriate for
the federal government to give consideration once more to the possi-
bility of enacting a federal incorporation act or a federal licensing
act for corporations.m When such measures were proposed forty
127. See Loss, ScunrrEs lEOuLAnToN 58-62 (1951); REtuc=mN, ThE ScHooLS
oF Com'oRATE REFORM (1950); Berlack, Federal Incorporation and Securities Regula-
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years ago, the federal government had not been so deeply enmeshed
in the field of investor protection and the political possibilities of the
enactment of such legislation were hampered by the different political
climate and the novelty of federal intervention in such a field. 12
All those factors have now been altered; the nation's commercial
system has become more unified, and the need for national legislation
has become more logical and more compelling. In the light of the
caliber of federal legislation already in effect in the area of investor
protection, it is likely that any federal corporation statute would be
of a character commensurate with the existing federal legislation in
the area; it seems unlikely that any federal statute concerning corpora-
tions which might be enacted would be less desirable than the present
general level of state corporation statutes. In any event, that risk seems
worth taking. Furthermore, it is probable that legislation could be
drafted in such a fashion as to permit the states to superimpose higher
or additional standards of conduct if they so chose. The federal gov-
ernment's role in the protection of investors is prominent and growing.
It would be logical, efficacious, and desirable for the control over se-
curities sales and markets to be combined with the regulation of
corporate affairs in one unified and correlated program of investor
protection. Although securities acts and corporation acts are designed
to deal with somewhat different sets of problems, there is considerable
overlapping and much similarity; 129 they could readily be designed to
intermesh and complement each other, instead of going their separate
ways with little or no reconciliation or correlation. The subject of
federal incorporation ought to be reopened and considered again at
this time as a complement to and an extension of the program for
investor protection already undertaken and administered by the fed-
eral government.
tion, 49 HAv. L. REV. 396 (1936); Jennings, Federal Incorporation or Licensing of
Interstate Corporate Business, 23 MiNN. L. REV. 710 (1939); Jennings, The Role of
the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CorEzN. PRoB.
193, 194-96 (1958); Reuschlein, Federalization-Design for Corporate Reform in a
National Economy, 91 U. PA. L. REV. 91 (1942).
128. The drive for federal incorporation legislation seems to have been blunted by
federal securities legislation, according to Loss, SEctnuRns REGULATION 61 (1951) &
Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23
LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 193, 196 (1958). Apparently, also federal securities legislation
has similarly had a blunting effect upon the possibility of developing corporation
statutes which are regulatory in character.
129. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor
Protection, 23 LAw & CoNTEm,. PnoB. 193 (1958); Kaplan, Corporation Law and
Securities Regulation, 18 Bus. LAw. 86 (1963).

